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We propose an integrated treatment of the problems of optimal monetary and 
fiscal policy, for an economy in which prices are sticky and the only available sources of 
government revenue are distorting taxes. Our linear-quadratic approach allows us to nest 
both conventional analyses of optimal monetary stabilization policy and analyses of 
optimal tax-smoothing as special cases of our more general framework. We show how a 
linear-quadratic policy problem can be derived which yields a correct linear 
approximation to the optimal policy rules from the point of view of the maximization of 
expected discounted utility in a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model. Finally, 
we derive targeting rules through which the monetary and fiscal authorities may 
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implement the optimal equilibrium. 
Keywords:  Loss function, output gap, tax smoothing, targeting rules Non-technical summary 
 
We propose an integrated treatment of the problems of optimal monetary and 
fiscal policy, for an economy in which prices are sticky and the only available sources of 
government revenue are distorting taxes. The integrated treatment allows us to consider 
how familiar characterizations of optimal monetary policy must be generalized to take 
account of the consequences of alternative monetary policies for the government budget, 
and to consider fiscal shocks as one of the types of disturbances to which monetary 
policy may need to respond. It also allows us to show how conventional characterizations 
of optimal tax policy can be generalized to the case in which economic activity depends 
not solely upon supply-side incentives, but on aggregate (nominal) demand as well. 
 
We show how a linear-quadratic policy problem can be derived that yields a 
correct linear approximation to the optimal policy rules from the point of view of the 
maximization of expected discounted utility.  This requires that we take account of the 
effects of stabilization policy (i.e., of the variances of endogenous variables) on the 
average levels of consumption and hours worked; but we show that such effects can be 
incorporated into the quadratic objective, so that we need not consider nonlinearities in 
the constraints on our policy problem. 
 
We show that a quadratic loss function can be derived that consists of a weighted 
average of two terms each period: squared deviations of the inflation rate from an optimal 
rate of zero, and squared deviations of log output from a target output level that varies 
over time as a function of exogenous disturbances to preferences, technology, and the 
government’s exogenous fiscal constraints. Thus consideration of the effects of tax 
distortions does not introduce any additional stabilization objectives beyond the ones 
(inflation stabilization and output-gap stabilization) considered in conventional 
treatments of monetary stabilization policy; both monetary and fiscal instruments should 
be used to stabilize inflation and the (appropriately defined) output gap. However, 
allowing for the distortions associated with raising government revenue can affect the 
weights on these objectives, and the proper definition of the target rate of output. 
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of price stickiness, and show, in a calibrated example, that the optimal responses that 
would be derived under the assumption of complete price flexibility are quite different 
than those that are optimal if prices are even slightly sticky; this indicates that allowing 
for price stickiness is quite important in exercises of this kind. In particular, optimal 
policy involves much greater stability of the inflation rate if prices are sticky, while 
shocks should instead have permanent effects on the level of government debt and on tax 
rates, even in the presence of nominal government debt. 
 
Finally, we derive targeting rules through which the monetary and fiscal 
authorities may implement the optimal equilibrium.  An optimal targeting rule for 
monetary policy in the case of distorting taxes still has the form of a flexible inflation 
targeting rule, as in the literature that ignores the fiscal consequences of monetary policy, 
but the output gap should modify the inflation target in a different way. We also obtain a 
targeting rule for the fiscal authority, and this too requires the fiscal authority to base 
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While there are by now substantial literatures seeking to characterize opti-
mal monetary and ¯scal policy respectively, the two literatures have largely
developed in isolation, and upon apparently contradictory foundations. The
modern literature on dynamically optimal ¯scal policy often abstracts from
monetary aspects of the economy altogether, and so implicitly allows for no
useful role for monetary policy. When monetary policy is considered within
the theory of optimal ¯scal policy, it is most often in the context of models
with °exible prices; in these models, monetary policy matters only (i) because
the level of nominal interest rates (and hence the opportunity cost of holding
money) determines the size of certain distortions that result from the attempt
to economize on money balances, and (ii) because the way in the price level
varies in response to real disturbances determines the state-contingent real
payo®s on (riskless) nominally-denominated government debt, which may
facilitate tax-smoothing in the case that explicitly state-contingent debt is
not available. The literature on optimal monetary policy has instead been
mainly concerned with quite distinct objectives for monetary stabilization
policy, namely the minimization of the distortions that result from prices
or wages that do not adjust quickly enough to clear markets. At the same
time, this literature typically ignores the ¯scal consequences of alternative
monetary policies; the characterizations of optimal monetary policy that are
obtained are thus strictly correct only for a world in which lump-sum taxes
are available.
Here we wish to consider the way in which the conclusions reached in
each of these two familiar literatures must be modi¯ed if one takes simul-
taneous account of the basic elements of the policy problems addressed in
each literature. On the one hand, we wish to consider how conventional
conclusions with regard to the nature of an optimal monetary policy rule
must be modi¯ed if one recognizes that the government's only sources of rev-
enue are distorting taxes, so that the ¯scal consequences of monetary policy
matter for welfare. And on the other hand, we wish to consider how conven-
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recognizes that prices do not instantaneously clear markets, so that output
determination depends on aggregate demand, in addition to the supply-side
factors stressed in the conventional theory of optimal taxation.
A number of recent papers have also sought to jointly consider optimal
monetary and ¯scal policy, in the context of models with sticky prices; im-
portant examples include Correia et al., (2001), Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe
(2001), and Siu (2001). Our approach di®ers from those taken in these
papers, however, in several respects. First, we model price stickiness in a
di®erent way than in any of these papers, namely, by assuming staggered
pricing of the kind introduced by Calvo (1983). This particular form of price
stickiness has been widely used both in analyses of optimal monetary policy
in models with explicit microfoundations (e.g., Goodfriend and King, 1997;
Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003) and in the empirical literature on op-
timizing models of the monetary transmission mechanism (e.g., Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1997; Gali and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone, 2002).
Perhaps more importantly, we obtain analytical results rather than purely
numerical ones. To obtain these results, we propose a linear-quadratic ap-
proach to the characterization of optimal monetary and ¯scal policy, that
allows us to nest both conventional analyses of optimal monetary policy, such
as that of Clarida et al. (1999), and analyses of optimal tax-smoothing in the
spirit of Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Aiyagari et al. (2002) as
special cases of our more general framework. We show how a linear-quadratic
policy problem can be derived which yields a correct linear approximation
to the optimal policy rules from the point of view of the maximization of ex-
pected discounted utility in a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model,
building on the work of Benigno and Woodford (2003) for the case of optimal
monetary policy when lump-sum taxes are available.
Finally, we do not content ourselves with merely characterizing the opti-
mal dynamic responses of our policy instruments (and other state variables)
to shocks under an optimal policy, given one assumption or another about the
nature and statistical properties of the exogenous disturbances to our model
economy. Instead, we also wish to derive policy rules that the monetary and
¯scal authorities may reasonably commit themselves to follow, as a way of
8
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optimal policy in terms of optimal targeting rules for monetary and ¯scal pol-
icy, of the kind proposed in the case of monetary policy by Svensson (1999),
Svensson and Woodford (2003), and Giannoni and Woodford (2002, 2003).
The rules are speci¯ed in terms of a target criterion for each authority; each
authority commits itself to use its policy instrument each period in whatever
way is necessary in order to allow it to project an evolution of the economy
consistent with its target criterion. As discussed in Giannoni and Woodford
(2002), we can derive rules of this form that are not merely consistent with
the desired equilibrium responses to disturbances, but that in addition (i)
imply a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium, so that there are not
other equally possible (but less desirable) equilibria consistent with the same
policy; and (ii) bring about optimal responses to shocks regardless of the
character of and statistical properties of the exogenous disturbances in the
model.
2 The Policy Problem
Here we describe our assumptions about the economic environment and pose
the optimization problem that jointly optimal monetary and ¯scal policies are
intended to solve. The approximation method that we use to characterize the
solution to this problem is then presented in the following section. Further
details of the derivation of the structural equations of our model of nominal
price rigidity can be found in Woodford (2003, chapter 3).
The goal of policy is assumed to be the maximization of the level of
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April 2004with an elasticity of substitution equal to µ > 1; and Ht(j) is the quantity
supplied of labor of type j. Each di®erentiated good is supplied by a single
monopolistically competitive producer. There are assumed to be many goods
in each of an in¯nite number of \industries"; the goods in each industry j
are produced using a type of labor that is speci¯c to that industry, and also
change their prices at the same time. The representative household supplies
all types of labor as well as consuming all types of goods.1 To simplify the
algebraic form of our results, we restrict attention in this paper to the case




t ¹ C~ ¾¡1
t









where ~ ¾;º > 0; and f ¹ Ct; ¹ Htg are bounded exogenous disturbance processes.
(We use the notation »t to refer to the complete vector of exogenous distur-
bances, including ¹ Ct and ¹ Ht:)
We assume a common technology for the production of all goods, in which
(industry-speci¯c) labor is the only variable input,
yt(i) = Atf(ht(i)) = Atht(i)
1=Á;
where At is an exogenously varying technology factor, and Á > 1. Inverting
the production function to write the demand for each type of labor as a
function of the quantities produced of the various di®erentiated goods, and
using the identity
Yt = Ct + Gt
to substitute for Ct, where Gt is exogenous government demand for the com-
posite good, we can write the utility of the representative household as a
function of the expected production plan fyt(i)g.2
1We might alternatively assume specialization across households in the type of labor
supplied; in the presence of perfect sharing of labor income risk across households, house-
hold decisions regarding consumption and labor supply would all be as assumed here.
2The government is assumed to need to obtain an exogenously given quantity of the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate each period, and to obtain this in a cost-minimizing fashion. Hence
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ferentiated goods each period as a function of their relative prices. This









di ¸ 1 (2.3)










and the vector »t now includes the exogenous disturbances Gt and At as well






The producers in each industry ¯x the prices of their goods in monetary
units for a random interval of time, as in the model of staggered pricing
introduced by Calvo (1983). We let 0 · ® < 1 be the fraction of prices that
remain unchanged in any period. A supplier that changes its price in period











where Qt;T is the stochastic discount factor by which ¯nancial markets dis-
count random nominal income in period T to determine the nominal value of
a claim to such income in period t, and ®T¡t is the probability that a price
chosen in period t will not have been revised by period T. In equilibrium,







the government allocates its purchases across the suppliers of di®erentiated goods in the
same proportion as do households, and the index of aggregate demand Yt is the same
function of the individual quantities fyt(i)g as Ct is of the individual quantities consumed
fct(i)g, de¯ned in (2.2).
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after-tax nominal pro¯ts of a supplier with price p; in an industry with com-
mon price pj; when the aggregate price index is equal to P, aggregate demand
is equal to Y , and sales revenues are taxed at rate ¿: Pro¯ts are equal to after-
tax sales revenues net of the wage bill, and the real wage demanded for labor








t ¸ 1 is an exogenous markup factor in the labor market (allowed to
vary over time, but assumed common to all labor markets),3 and ¯rms are
assumed to be wage-takers. We allow for wage markup variations in order to
include the possibility of a \pure cost-push shock" that a®ects equilibrium
pricing behavior while implying no change in the e±cient allocation of re-
sources. Note that variation in the tax rate ¿t has a similar e®ect on this
pricing problem (and hence on supply behavior); this is the sole distortion
associated with tax policy in the present model.
Each of the suppliers that revise their prices in period t choose the same
new price p¤












where ! ´ Á(1 + º) ¡ 1 > 0 is the elasticity of real marginal cost in an
industry with respect to industry output, and Ft and Kt are functions of
current aggregate output Yt, the current tax rate ¿t; the current exogenous
state »t;4 and the expected future evolution of in°ation, output, taxes and
disturbances, de¯ned in the appendix.










3In the case that we assume that ¹w
t = 1 at all times, our model is one in which both
households and ¯rms are wage-takers, or there is e±cient contracting between them.
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where ¦t ´ Pt=Pt¡1: This de¯nes a short-run aggregate supply relation be-
tween in°ation and output, given the current tax rate ¿t; current disturbances
»t; and expectations regarding future in°ation, output, taxes and distur-
bances. Because the relative prices of the industries that do not change their
prices in period t remain the same, we can also use (2.10) to derive a law of
motion of the form
¢t = h(¢t¡1;¦t) (2.12)
for the dispersion measure de¯ned in (2.3). This is the source in our model
of welfare losses from in°ation or de°ation.
We abstract here from any monetary frictions that would account for a
demand for central-bank liabilities that earn a substandard rate of return;
we nonetheless assume that the central bank can control the riskless short-
term nominal interest rate it;5 which is in turn related to other ¯nancial asset
prices through the arbitrage relation
1 + it = [EtQt;t+1]
¡1:
We shall assume that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates never
binds under the optimal policies considered below,6 so that we need not
introduce any additional constraint on the possible paths of output and prices
associated with a need for the chosen evolution of prices to be consistent with
a non-negative nominal interest rate.
Our abstraction from monetary frictions, and hence from the existence
of seignorage revenues, does not mean that monetary policy has no ¯scal
consequences, for interest-rate policy and the equilibrium in°ation that re-
sults from it have implications for the real burden of government debt. For
5For discussion of how this is possible even in a \cashless" economy of the kind assumed
here, see Woodford (2003, chapter 2).
6This can be shown to be true in the case of small enough disturbances, given that the
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April 2004simplicity, we shall assume that all public debt consists of riskless nominal
one-period bonds. The nominal value Bt of end-of-period public debt then
evolves according to a law of motion
Bt = (1 + it¡1)Bt¡1 + Ptst; (2.13)
where the real primary budget surplus is given by
st ´ ¿tYt ¡ Gt ¡ ³t: (2.14)
Here ¿t, the share of the national product that is collected by the government
as tax revenues in period t, is the key ¯scal policy decision each period; the
real value of (lump-sum) government transfers ³t is treated as exogenously
given, as are government purchases Gt: (We introduce the additional type of
exogenously given ¯scal needs so as to be able to analyze the consequences of
a \purely ¯scal" disturbance, with no implications for the real allocation of
resources beyond those that follow from its e®ect on the government budget.)
Rational-expectations equilibrium requires that the expected path of gov-








in each state of the world that may be realized at date t,7 where Rt;T ´
Qt;TPT=Pt is the stochastic discount factor for a real income stream, and
This condition restricts the possible paths that may be chosen for the tax rate
f¿tg: Monetary policy can a®ect this constraint, however, both by a®ecting
the period t in°ation rate (which a®ects the left-hand side) and (in the case
of sticky prices) by a®ecting the discount factors fRt;Tg.
Under the standard (Ramsey) approach to the characterization of an opti-
mal policy commitment, one chooses among state-contingent paths f¦t;Yt;¿t;bt;¢tg
7See Woodford (2003, chapter 2) for derivation of this condition from household opti-
mization together with market clearing. The condition should not be interpreted as an
a priori constraint on possible government policy rules, as discussed in Woodford (2001).
However, when we consider the problem of choosing an optimal plan from the among
the possible rational-expectations equilibria, this condition must be imposed among the
constraints on the set of equilibria that one may hope to bring about.
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each t ¸ t0; given initial government debt bt0¡1 and price dispersion ¢t0¡1;
so as to maximize (2.5). Such a t0¡optimal plan requires commitment, in-
sofar as the corresponding t¡optimal plan for some later date t, given the
conditions bt¡1;¢t¡1 obtaining at that date, will not involve a continuation
of the t0¡optimal plan. This failure of time consistency occurs because the
constraints on what can be achieved at date t0; consistent with the exis-
tence of a rational-expectations equilibrium, depend on the expected paths
of in°ation, output and taxes at later dates; but in the absence of a prior
commitment, a planner would have no motive at those later dates to choose
a policy consistent with the anticipations that it was desirable to create at
date t0:
However, the degree of advance commitment that is necessary to bring





T¡t~ uc(YT ¡ GT;»T)sT;
and let F be the set of values for (bt¡1;¢t¡1;Ft;Kt;Wt) such that there exist
paths f¦T;YT;¿T;bT;¢Tg for dates T ¸ t that satisfy (2.11), (2.12), and
(2.15) for each T, that are consistent with the speci¯ed values for Ft;Kt; and
Wt; and that imply a well-de¯ned value for the objective Ut de¯ned in (2.5).
Furthermore, for any (bt¡1;¢t¡1;Ft;Kt;Wt) 2 F; let V (bt¡1;¢t¡1;Xt;»t) de-
note the maximum attainable value of Ut among the state-contingent paths
that satisfy the constraints just mentioned, where Xt ´ (Ft;Kt;Wt):8 Then
the t0¡optimal plan can be obtained as the solution to a two-stage optimiza-
tion problem, as shown in the appendix.
In the ¯rst stage, values of the endogenous variables xt0, where xt ´
(¦t;Yt;¿t;bt;¢t), and state-contingent commitments Xt0+1(»t0+1) for the fol-
lowing period, are chosen, subject to a set of constraints stated in the ap-
pendix, including the requirement that the choices (bt0;¢t0;Xt0+1) 2 F for
8In our notation for the value function V; »t denotes not simply the vector of distur-
bances in period t, but all information in period t about current and future disturbances.
This corresponds to the disturbance vector »t referred to earlier in the case that the dis-
turbance vector follows a Markov process.
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maximize the objective ^ J[xt0;Xt0+1(¢)](»t0); where we de¯ne the functional
^ J[xt;Xt+1(¢)](»t) ´ U(Yt;¢t;»t) + ¯EtV (bt;¢t;Xt+1;»t+1): (2.16)
In the second stage, the equilibrium evolution from period t0 + 1 onward is
chosen to solve the maximization problem that de¯nes the value function
V (bt0;¢t0;Xt0+1;»t0+1), given the state of the world »t0+1 and the precom-
mitted values for Xt0+1 associated with that state. The key to this result is
a demonstration that there are no restrictions on the evolution of the econ-
omy from period t0 + 1 onward that are required in order for this expected
evolution to be consistent with the values chosen for xt0, except consistency
with the commitments Xt0+1(»t0+1) chosen in the ¯rst stage.
The optimization problem in stage two of this reformulation of the Ram-
sey problem is of the same form as the Ramsey problem itself, except that
there are additional constraints associated with the precommitted values for
the elements of Xt0+1(»t0+1): Let us consider a problem like the Ramsey
problem just de¯ned, looking forward from some period t0; except under the
constraints that the quantities Xt0 must take certain given values, where
(bt0¡1;¢t0¡1;Xt0) 2 F: This constrained problem can similarly be expressed
as a two-stage problem of the same form as above, with an identical stage two
problem to the one described above. Stage two of this constrained problem
is thus of exactly the same form as the problem itself. Hence the constrained
problem has a recursive form. It can be decomposed into an in¯nite sequence
of problems, in which in each period t, (xt;Xt+1(¢)) are chosen to maximize
^ J[xt;Xt+1(¢)](»t), subject to the constraints of the stage one problem, given
the predetermined state variables (bt¡1;¢t¡1) and the precommitted values
Xt:
Our aim here is to characterize policy that solves this constrained opti-
mization problem (stage two of the original Ramsey problem), i.e., policy that
is optimal from some date t onward given precommitted values for Xt. Be-
cause of the recursive form of this problem, it is possible for a commitment to
a time-invariant policy rule from date t onward to implement an equilibrium
that solves the problem, for some speci¯cation of the initial commitments Xt:
A time-invariant policy rule with this property is said by Woodford (2003,
16
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that a policymaker that solves a traditional Ramsey problem would be willing
to commit to eventually follow, though the solution to the Ramsey problem
involves di®erent behavior initially, as there is no need to internalize the ef-
fects of prior anticipation of the policy adopted for period t0:10 One might
also argue that it is desirable to commit to follow such a rule immediately,
even though such a policy would not solve the (unconstrained) Ramsey prob-
lem, as a way of demonstrating one's willingness to accept constraints that
one wishes the public to believe that one will accept in the future.
3 A Linear-Quadratic Approximate Problem
In fact, we shall here characterize the solution to this problem (and simi-
larly, derive optimal time-invariant policy rules) only for initial conditions
near certain steady-state values, allowing us to use local approximations in
characterizing optimal policy.11 We establish that these steady-state values
have the property that if one starts from initial conditions close enough to
the steady state, and exogenous disturbances thereafter are small enough, the
optimal policy subject to the initial commitments remains forever near the
steady state. Hence our local characterization would describe the long run
character of Ramsey policy, in the event that disturbances are small enough,
and that deterministic Ramsey policy would converge to the steady state.12
9See also Woodford (1999) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
10For example, in the case of positive initial nominal government debt, the t0¡optimal
policy would involve a large in°ation in period t0; in order to reduce the pre-existing debt
burden, but a commitment not to respond similarly to the existence of nominal government
debt in later periods.
11Local approximations of the same sort are often used in the literature in numerical
characterizations of Ramsey policy. Strictly speaking, however, such approximations are
valid only in the case of initial commitments Xt0 near enough to the steady-state values of
these variables, and the t0¡optimal (Ramsey) policy need not involve values of Xt0 near
the steady-state values, even in the absence of random disturbances.
12Benigno and Woodford (2003) gives an example of an application in which Ramsey
policy does converge asymptotically to the steady state, so that the solution to the ap-
proximate problem approximates the response to small shocks under the Ramsey policy,
at dates long enough after t0. We cannot make a similar claim in the present application,
17
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however, because of the unit root in the dynamics associated with optimal policy.Of greater interest here, it describes policy that is optimal from a timeless
perspective in the event of small disturbances.
We ¯rst must show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal
policy (under appropriate initial conditions) that involves constant values of
all variables. To this end we consider the purely deterministic case, in which
the exogenous disturbances ¹ Ct; Gt; ¹ Ht; At; ¹w
t ; ³t each take constant values
¹ C; ¹ G; ¹ H; ¹ A; ¹ ¹w > 0 and ¹ ³ ¸ 0 for all t ¸ t0; and assume an initial real public
debt bt0¡1 = ¹ b > 0. We wish to ¯nd an initial degree of price dispersion
¢t0¡1 and initial commitments Xt0 = ¹ X such that the solution to the \stage
two" problem de¯ned above involves a constant policy xt = ¹ x;Xt+1 = ¹ X each
period, in which ¹ b is equal to the initial real debt and ¹ ¢ is equal to the initial
price dispersion. We show in the appendix that the ¯rst-order conditions for
this problem admit a steady-state solution of this form, and we verify below
that the second-order conditions for a local optimum are also satis¯ed.
Regardless of the initial public debt ¹ b; we show that ¹ ¦ = 1 (zero in°ation),
and correspondingly that ¹ ¢ = 1 (zero price dispersion). Note that our
conclusion that the optimal steady-state in°ation rate is zero generalizes the
result of Benigno and Woodford (2003) for the case in which taxes are lump-
sum at the margin. We may furthermore assume without loss of generality
that the constant values of ¹ C and ¹ H are chosen (given the initial government
debt¹ b) so that in the optimal steady state, Ct = ¹ C and Ht = ¹ H each period.13
The associated steady-state tax rate is given by
¹ ¿ = sG +
¹ ³ + (1 ¡ ¯)¹ b
¹ Y
;
where ¹ Y = ¹ C + ¹ G > 0 is the steady-state output level, and sG ´ ¹ G=¹ Y < 1 is
the steady-state share of output purchased by the government. As shown in
the appendix, this solution necessarily satis¯es 0 < ¹ ¿ < 1:
We next wish to characterize the optimal responses to small perturbations
of the initial conditions and small °uctuations in the disturbance processes
around the above values. To do this, we compute a linear-quadratic approx-
imate problem, the solution to which represents a linear approximation to
13Note that we may assign arbitrary positive values to ¹ C; ¹ H without changing the nature
of the implied preferences, as long as the value of ¸ is appropriately adjusted.
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in Benigno and Woodford (2003). An important advantage of this approach
is that it allows direct comparison of our results with those obtained in other
analyses of optimal monetary stabilization policy. Other advantages are that
it makes it straightforward to verify whether the second-order conditions hold
that are required in order for a solution to our ¯rst-order conditions to be
at least a local optimum,14 and that it provides us with a welfare measure
with which to rank alternative sub-optimal policies, in addition to allowing
computation of the optimal policy.
We begin by computing a Taylor-series approximation to our welfare mea-
sure (2.5), expanding around the steady-state allocation de¯ned above, in
which yt(i) = ¹ Y for each good at all times and »t = 0 at all times.15 As a
second-order (logarithmic) approximation to this measure, we obtain16









t + b Ytu»»t ¡ u¢ ^ ¢t
+ t.i.p. + O(jj»jj
3); (3.1)
where ^ Yt ´ log(Yt=¹ Y ) and ^ ¢t ´ log¢t measure deviations of aggregate out-
put and the price dispersion measure from their steady-state levels, the term
\t.i.p." collects terms that are independent of policy (constants and func-
tions of exogenous disturbances) and hence irrelevant for ranking alternative
policies, and jj»jj is a bound on the amplitude of our perturbations of the
steady state.17 Here the coe±cient
© ´ 1 ¡
µ ¡ 1
µ
1 ¡ ¹ ¿
¹ ¹w < 1
14Benigno and Woodford (2003) show that these conditions can fail to hold, so that a
small amount of arbitrary randomization of policy is welfare-improving, but argue that
the conditions under which this occurs in their model are not empirically plausible.
15Here the elements of »t are assumed to be ¹ ct ´ log( ¹ Ct= ¹ C);¹ ht ´ log( ¹ Ht= ¹ H);at ´
log(At= ¹ A); ^ ¹w
t ´ log(¹w
t =¹ ¹w); ^ Gt ´ (Gt ¡ ¹ G)=¹ Y ; and ^ ³t ´ (³t ¡ ¹ ³)=¹ Y ; so that a value
of zero for this vector corresponds to the steady-state values of all disturbances. The
perturbations ^ Gt and ³t are not de¯ned to be logarithmic so that we do not have to
assume positive steady-state values for these variables.
16See the appendix for details. Our calculations here follow closely those of Woodford
(2003, chapter 6) and Benigno and Woodford (2003).
17Speci¯cally, we use the notation O(jj»jjk) as shorthand for O(jj»;^ bt0¡1; ^ ¢
1=2
t0¡1; ^ Xt0jjk);
where in each case hats refer to log deviations from the steady-state values of the various
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parameters of the policy problem. We treat ^ ¢
1=2
t0 as an expansion parameter, rather than
^ ¢t0 because (2.12) implies that deviations of the in°ation rate from zero of order ² only
result in deviations in the dispersion measure ¢t from one of order ²2: We are thus entitled
to treat the °uctuations in ¢t as being only of second order in our bound on the amplitude
of disturbances, since if this is true at some initial date it will remain true thereafter.measures the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor, and
hence the ine±ciency of the steady-state output level ¹ Y : Under the assump-
tion that ¹ b > 0; we necessarily have © > 0; meaning that steady-state output
is ine±ciently low. The coe±cients uyy;u» and u¢ are de¯ned in the ap-
pendix.
Under the Calvo assumption about the distribution of intervals between
price changes, we can relate the dispersion of prices to the overall rate of
in°ation, allowing us to rewrite (3.1) as









t + b Ytu»»t ¡ u¼¼
2
t]
+ t.i.p. + O(jj»jj
3); (3.2)
for a certain coe±cient u¼ > 0 de¯ned in the appendix, where ¼t ´ log¦t
is the in°ation rate. Thus we are able to write our stabilization objective
purely in terms of the evolution of the aggregate variables f^ Yt;¼tg and the
exogenous disturbances.
We note that when © > 0; there is a non-zero linear term in (3.2), which
means that we cannot expect to evaluate this expression to second order using
only an approximate solution for the path of aggregate output that is accurate
only to ¯rst order. Thus we cannot determine optimal policy, even up to ¯rst
order, using this approximate objective together with approximations to the
structural equations that are accurate only to ¯rst order. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) avoid this problem by assuming an output subsidy (i.e.,
a value ¹ ¿ < 0) of the size needed to ensure that © = 0: Here we do not
wish to make this assumption, because we assume that lump-sum taxes are
unavailable, in which case © = 0 would be possible only in the case of a
particular initial level of government assets ¹ b < 0: Furthermore, we are more
interested in the case in which government revenue needs are more acute
than that would imply.
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this problem, which is to use a second-order approximation to the aggregate-
supply relation to eliminate the linear terms in the quadratic welfare measure.
In the model that they consider, where taxes are lump-sum (and so do not
a®ect the aggregate supply relation), a forward-integrated second-order ap-
proximation to this relation allows one to express the expected discounted
value of output terms ©^ Yt as a function of purely quadratic terms (except for
certain transitory terms that do not a®ect the \stage two" policy problem).
In the present case, the level of distorting taxes has a ¯rst-order e®ect on the
aggregate-supply relation (see equation (3.6) below), so that the forward-
integrated relation involves the expected discounted value of the tax rate
as well as the expected discounted value of output. However, as shown in
the appendix, a second-order approximation to the intertemporal solvency
condition (2.15)18 provides another relation between the expected discounted
values of output and the tax rate and a set of purely quadratic terms. These
two second-order approximations to the structural equations that appear as
constraints in our policy problem can then be used to express the expected
discounted value of output terms in (3.2) in terms of purely quadratic terms.



















+ Tt0 + t.i.p. + O(jj»jj
3);
(3.3)
where again the coe±cients are de¯ned in the appendix. The expression
b Y ¤
t indicates a function of the vector of exogenous disturbances »t de¯ned
in the appendix, while Tt0 is a transitory component. In the case that the
alternative policies from date t0 onward to be evaluated must be consistent
with a vector of prior commitments Xt0; one can show that the value of
the term Tt0 is implied (to a second-order approximation) by the value of
Xt0. Hence for purposes of characterizing optimal policy from a timeless
18Since we are interested in providing an approximate characterization of the \stage
two" policy problem, in which a precommitted value of Wt appears as a constraint, it
is actually a second-order approximation to that constraint that we need. However, this
latter constraint has the same form as (2.15); the di®erence is only in which quantities in
the relation are taken to have predetermined values.
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where a lower value of (3.4) implies a higher value of (3.3). Because this
loss function is purely quadratic (i.e., lacking linear terms), it is possible
to evaluate it to second order using only a ¯rst-order approximation to the
equilibrium evolution of in°ation and output under a given policy. Hence
log-linear approximations to the structural relations of our model su±ce,
yielding a standard linear-quadratic policy problem.
In order for this linear-quadratic problem to have a bounded solution
(which then approximates the solution to the exact problem), we must verify
that the quadratic objective (3.4) is convex. We show in the appendix that
qy;q¼ > 0; so that the objective is convex, as long as the steady-state tax rate
¹ ¿ and share of government purchases sG in the national product are below
certain positive bounds. We shall here assume that these conditions are sat-
is¯ed, i.e., that the government's ¯scal needs are not too severe. Note that
in this case, our quadratic objective turns out to be of a form commonly as-
sumed in the literature on monetary policy evaluation; that is, policy should
seek to minimize the discounted value of a weighted sum of squared devia-
tions of in°ation from an optimal level (here zero) and squared °uctuations
in an \output gap" yt ´ ^ Yt ¡ ^ Y ¤
t ; where the target output level ^ Y ¤
t depends
on the various exogenous disturbances in a way discussed in the appendix.
It is also perhaps of interest to note that a \tax smoothing" objective of the
kind postulated by Barro (1979) and Bohn (1990) does not appear in our
welfare measure as a separate objective. Instead, tax distortions are relevant
only insofar as they result in \output gaps" of the same sort that monetary
stabilization policy aims to minimize.
We turn next to the form of the log-linear constraints in the approximate
policy problem. A ¯rst-order Taylor series expansion of (2.11) around the
zero-in°ation steady state yields the log-linear aggregate-supply relation
¼t = ·[^ Yt + Ã^ ¿t + c
0
»»t] + ¯Et¼t+1; (3.5)
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curve" relation,19 extended here to take account of the e®ects of variations
in the level of distorting taxes on supply costs.
It is useful to write this approximate aggregate-supply relation in terms
of the welfare-relevant output gap yt. Equation (3.5) can be equivalently be
written as
¼t = ·[yt + Ã^ ¿t + ut] + ¯Et¼t+1; (3.6)
where ut is composite \cost-push" disturbance, indicating the degree to which
the various exogenous disturbances included in »t preclude simultaneous sta-
bilization of in°ation, the welfare-relevant output gap, and the tax rate.
Alternatively we can write
¼t = ·[yt + Ã(^ ¿t ¡ ^ ¿
¤
t )] + ¯Et¼t+1; (3.7)
where ^ ¿¤
t ´ ¡Ã¡1ut indicates the tax change needed at any time to o®set
the\cost-push" shock, in order to allow simultaneous stabilization of in°ation
and the output gap (the two stabilization objectives re°ected in (3.4)).
The e®ects of the various exogenous disturbances in »t on the \cost-push"
term ut are explained in the appendix. It is worth noting that under certain
conditions ut is una®ected by some disturbances. In the case that © = 0; the
cost-push term is given by
ut = u»5^ ¹
w
t ; (3.8)
where in this case, u»5 = q¡1
y > 0: Thus the cost-push term is a®ected only by
variations in the wage markup ^ ¹t; it does not vary in response to taste shocks,
technology shocks, government purchases, or variations in government trans-
fers. The reason is that when © = 0 and neither taxes nor the wage markup
vary from their steady-state values, the °exible-price equilibrium is e±cient;
it follows that level of output consistent with zero in°ation is also the one
that maximizes welfare, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chapter 6).
Even when © > 0; if there are no government purchases (so that sG =
0) and no ¯scal shocks (meaning that ^ Gt = 0 and ^ ³t = 0), then the ut
term is again of the form (3.8), but with u»5 = (1 ¡ ©)q¡1
y ; as discussed in
Benigno and Woodford (2003). Hence in this case neither taste or technology
19See, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003, chapter 3).
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if neither taxes nor the wage markup ever vary, the °exible-price equilibrium
value of output and the e±cient level vary in exactly the same proportion
in response to each of the other types of shocks; hence in°ation stabilization
also stabilizes the gap between actual output and the e±cient level. Another
special case is the limiting case of linear utility of consumption (¾¡1 = 0); in
this case, ut is again of the form (3.8), for a di®erent value of u»5: In general,
however, when © > 0 and sG > 0; all of the disturbances shift the °exible-
price equilibrium level of output (under a constant tax rate) and the e±cient
level of output to di®ering extents, resulting in \cost-push" contributions
from all of these shocks.
The other constraint on possible equilibrium paths is the intertemporal
government solvency condition. A log-linear approximation to (2.15) can be
written in the form
^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ ¾




T¡t[byyT + b¿(^ ¿T ¡ ^ ¿
¤
T)]; (3.9)
where ¾ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private ex-
penditure, and the coe±cients by;b¿ are de¯ned in the appendix, as is ft, a
composite measure of exogenous \¯scal stress." Here we have written the
solvency condition in terms of the same output gap and \tax gap" as equa-
tion (3.7), to make clear the extent to which complete stabilization of the
variables appearing in the loss function (3.4) is possible. The constraint can
also be written in a \°ow" form,
^ bt¡1¡¼t¡¾





together with a transversality condition.20
We note that the only reason why it should not be possible to completely
stabilize both in°ation and the output gap from some date t onward is if the
sum ^ bt¡1+ft is non-zero. The composite disturbance ft therefore completely
summarizes the information at date t about the exogenous disturbances that
20If we restrict attention to bounded paths for the endogenous variables, then a path
satis¯es (3.9) in each period t ¸ t0 if and only if it satis¯es the °ow budget constraint
(3.10) in each period.
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possible; and under an optimal policy, the state-contingent evolution of the
in°ation rate, the output gap, and the real public debt depend solely on the
evolution of the single composite disturbance process fftg:
This result contrasts with the standard literature on optimal monetary
stabilization policy, in which (in the absence of a motive for interest-rate
stabilization, as here) it is instead the cost-push term ut that summarizes the
extent to which exogenous disturbances require that °uctuations in in°ation
and in the output gap should occur. Note that in the case that there are no
government purchases and no ¯scal shocks, ut corresponds simply to (3.8).
Thus, for example, it is concluded (in a model with lump-sum taxes) that
there should be no variation in in°ation in response to a technology shock
(Khan et al., 2002; Benigno and Woodford, 2003). But even in this simple
case, the ¯scal stress is given by an expression of the form
ft ´ h
0







where the expressions h0
»»t and f0
»»t both generally include non-zero coe±-
cients on preference and technology shocks, in addition to the markup shock,
as shown in the appendix. Hence many disturbances that do not have cost-
push e®ects nonetheless result in optimal variations in both in°ation and the
output gap.
Finally, we wish to consider optimal policy subject to the constraints
that Ft0;Kt0 and Wt0 take given (precommitted) values. Again, only log-
linear approximations to these constraints matter for a log-linear approxi-
mate characterization of optimal policy. As discussed in the appendix, the
corresponding constraints in our approximate model are precommitments
regarding the state-contingent values of ¼t0 and yt0:
To summarize, our approximate policy problem involves the choice of
state-contingent paths for the endogenous variables f¼t;yt; ^ ¿t;^ btg from some
date t0 onward so as to minimize the quadratic loss function (3.4), subject
to the constraint that conditions (3.7) and (3.9) be satis¯ed each period,
given an initial value ^ bt0¡1 and subject also to the constraints that ¼t0 and
yt0 equal certain precommitted values (that may depend on the state of the
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tion of the endogenous variables in response to exogenous shocks, in the
rational-expectations equilibrium that solves this problem. We then turn to
the derivation of optimal policy rules, commitment to which should imple-
ment an equilibrium of this kind.
4 Optimal Responses to Shocks: The Case of
Flexible Prices
In considering the solution to the problem of stabilization policy just posed,
it may be useful to ¯rst consider the simple case in which prices are fully
°exible. This is the limiting case of our model in which ® = 0; with the
consequence that q¼ = 0 in (3.4), and that ·¡1 = 0 in (3.7). Hence our










subject to the constraints
yt + Ã(^ ¿t ¡ ^ ¿
¤
t ) = 0 (4.2)
and (3.9). It is easily seen that in this case, the optimal policy is one that
achieves yt = 0 at all times. Because of (4.2), this requires that ^ ¿t = ^ ¿¤
t
at all times. The in°ation rate is then determined by the requirement of
government intertemporal solvency,
¼t = ^ bt¡1 + ft:
This last equation implies that unexpected in°ation must equal the inno-
vation in the ¯scal stress,
¼t ¡ Et¡1¼t = ft ¡ Et¡1ft:
Expected in°ation, and hence the evolution of nominal government debt, are
indeterminate. If we add to our assumed policy objective a small preference
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then the optimal policy will be one that involves Et¼t+1 = 0 each period, so
that the nominal public debt must evolve according to
^ bt = ¡Etft+1:
If, instead, we were to assume the existence of small monetary frictions (and
zero interest on money), the tie would be broken by the requirement that the
nominal interest rate equal zero each period.22 The required expected rate of
in°ation (and hence the required evolution of the nominal public debt) would
then be determined by the variation in the equilibrium real rate of return
implied by a real allocation in which ^ Yt = ^ Y ¤
t each period. That is, one
would have Et¼t+1 = ¡r¤
t, where r¤
t is the (exogenous) real rate of interest
associated output at the target level each period, and so
^ bt = ¡r
¤
t ¡ Etft+1:
We thus obtain simple conclusions about the determinants of °uctuations
in in°ation, output and the tax rate under optimal policy. Unexpected in-
°ation variations occur as needed in order to prevent taxes from ever having
to be varied in order to respond to variations in ¯scal stress, as in the anal-
yses of Bohn (1990) and Chari and Kehoe (1999). This allows a model with
only riskless nominal government debt to achieve the same state-contingent
allocation of resources as the government would choose to bring about if it
21Note that this preference can be justi¯ed in terms of our model, in the case that ® is
positive though extremely small. For there will then be a very small positive value for q¼,
implying that reduction of the expected discounted value of in°ation is preferred to the
extent that this does not require any increase in the expected discounted value of squared
output gaps.
22The result relies upon the fact that the distortions created by the monetary frictions
are minimized in the case of a zero opportunity cost of holding money each period, as
argued by Friedman (1969). Neither the existence of e®ects of nominal interest rates on
supply costs (so that an interest-rate term should appear in the aggregate-supply relation
(4.2)) nor the contribution of seignorage revenues to the government budget constraint
make any di®erence to the result, since unexpected changes in revenue needs can always be
costlessly obtained through unexpected in°ation, while any desired shifts in the aggregate-
supply relation to o®set cost-push shocks can be achieved by varying the tax rate.
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(1983).
Because taxes do not have to adjust in response to variations in ¯scal
stress, as in the tax-smoothing model of Barro (1979), it is possible to
\smooth" them across states as well as over time. However, the sense in
which it is desirable to \smooth" tax rates is that of minimizing variation
in the gap ^ ¿t ¡ ^ ¿¤
t , rather than variation in the tax rate itself.23 In other
words, it is really the \tax gap" ^ ¿t ¡ ^ ¿¤
t that should be smoothed. Under
certain special circumstances, it will not be optimal for tax rates to vary in
response to shocks; these are the conditions, discussed above, under which
shocks have no cost-push e®ects, so that there is no change in ^ ¿¤
t . For ex-
ample, if there are no government purchases and there is no variation in the
wage markup, this will be the case. But more generally, all disturbances will
have some cost-push e®ect, and result in variations in ^ ¿¤
t : There will then be
variations in the tax rate in response to these shocks under an optimal policy.
However, there will be no unit root in the tax rate, as in the Barro (1979)
model of optimal tax policy. Instead, as in the analysis of Lucas and Stokey
(1983), the optimal °uctuations in the tax rate will be stationary, and will
have the same persistence properties as the real disturbances (speci¯cally,
the persistence properties of the composite cost-push shock).
Variations in ¯scal stress will instead require changes in the tax rate, as
in the analysis of Barro (1979), if we suppose that the government issues
only riskless indexed debt, rather than the riskless nominal debt assumed in
our baseline model. (Again, for simplicity we assume that only one-period
riskless debt is issued.) In this case the objective function (3.4) and the
constraints (3.9) and (4.2) remain the same, but b
¹
t¡1 ´ ^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t; the real
value of private claims on the government at the beginning of period t, is now
23A number of authors (e.g., Chari et al., 1991, 1994; Hall and Krieger, 2000; Aiyagari
et al., 2002) have found that in calibrated °exible-price models with state-contingent
government debt, the optimal variation in labor tax rates is quite small. Our results
indicate this as well, in the case that real disturbances have only small cost-push e®ects,
and we have listed earlier various conditions under which this will be the case. But under
some circumstances, optimal policy may involve substantial volatility of the tax rate, and
indeed, more volatility of the tax rate than of in°ation. This would be the case if shocks
occur that have large cost-push e®ects while having relatively little e®ect on ¯scal stress.
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are no longer able to relax the intertemporal government solvency condition.
In fact, rewriting the constraint (3.9) in terms of b
¹
t¡1; we see that the path
of in°ation is now completely irrelevant to welfare.
The solution to this optimization problem is now less trivial, as com-
plete stabilization of the output gap is not generally possible. The optimal
state-contingent evolution of output and taxes can be determined using a
Lagrangian method, as in Woodford (2003, chapter 7). The Lagrangian for














¡(1 ¡ ¯)(byyt + b¿^ ¿t) ¡ ¯(b
¹
t ¡ ¾
¡1yt+1)]g + ¾'2;t0¡1yt0; (4.3)
where '1t;'2t are Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (4.2) and
(3.10) respectively,24 for each t ¸ t0; and ¾'2;t0¡1 is the notation used for the
multiplier associated with the additional constraint that yt0 = ¹ yt0: The latter
constraint is added in order to characterize optimal policy from a timeless
perspective, as discussed at the end of section 2; the particular notation used
for the multiplier on this constraint results in a time-invariant form for the
¯rst-order conditions, as seen below.25 We have dropped terms from the
Lagrangian that are not functions of the endogenous variables yt and ^ ¿t; i.e.,
products of multipliers and exogenous disturbances, as these do not a®ect
our calculation of the implied ¯rst-order conditions.
The resulting ¯rst-order condition with respect to yt is
qyyt = ¡'1t + [(1 ¡ ¯)by + ¾
¡1]'2t ¡ ¾
¡1'2;t¡1; (4.4)
that with respect to ^ ¿t is
Ã'1t = (1 ¡ ¯)b¿'2t; (4.5)
24Alternatively, '2t is the multiplier associated with constraint (3.9).
25It should be recalled that in order for policy to be optimal from a timeless perspective,
the state-contingent initial commitment ¹ yt0 must be chosen in a way that conforms to the
state-contingent commitment regarding yt that will be chosen in all later periods, so that
the optimal policy can be implemented by a time-invariant rule. Hence it is convenient to
present the ¯rst-order conditions in a time-invariant form.
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¹
t is
'2t = Et'2;t+1: (4.6)
Each of these conditions must be satis¯ed for each t ¸ t0; along with the
structural equations (4.2) and (3.9) for each t ¸ t0; for given initial values
b
¹
t0¡1 and yt0: We look for a bounded solution to these equations, so that (in
the event of small enough disturbances) none of the state variables leave a
neighborhood of the steady-state values, in which our local approximation
to the equilibrium conditions and our welfare objective remain accurate.26
Given the existence of such a bounded solution, the transversality condition
is necessarily satis¯ed, so that the solution to these ¯rst-order conditions
represents an optimal plan.
An analytical solution to these equations is easily given. Using equation
(4.2) to substitute for ^ ¿t in the forward-integrated version of (3.9), then
equations (4.4) and (4.5) to substitute for yt as a function of the path of '2t;
and ¯nally using (4.6) to replace all terms of the form Et'2;t+j (for j ¸ 0)











coe±cients mb;nb are de¯ned in the appendix. The implied dynamics of the
government debt are then given by
b
¹
t = ¡Etft+1 ¡ nb'2t:
This allows a complete solution for the evolution of government debt and the
multiplier, given the composite exogenous disturbance process fftg, starting
26In the only such solution, the variables ^ ¿t , b
¹
t and yt are all permanently a®ected
by shocks, even when the disturbances are all assumed to be stationary (and bounded)
processes. Hence a bounded solution exists only under the assumption that random distur-
bances occur only in a ¯nite number of periods. However, our characterization of optimal
policy does not depend on a particular bound on the number of periods in which there are
disturbances, or which periods these are; in order to allow disturbances in a larger number
of periods, we must assume a tighter bound on the amplitude of disturbances, in order
for the optimal paths of the endogenous variables to remain within a given neighborhood
of the steady-state values. Aiyagari et al. (2002) discuss the asymptotic behavior of the
optimal plan in the exact nonlinear version of a problem similar to this one, in the case
that disturbances occur inde¯nitely.
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¹
t0¡1 and '2;t0¡1:27 Given these solutions, the optimal
evolution of the output gap and tax rate are given by
yt = m''2t + n''2;t¡1;




where m';n' are again de¯ned in the appendix. The evolution of in°ation
remains indeterminate. If we again assume a preference for in°ation stabi-
lization when it is costless, optimal policy involves ¼t = 0 at all times.
In this case, unlike that of nominal debt, in°ation is not a®ected by a pure
¯scal shock (or indeed any other shock) under the optimal policy, but instead
the output gap and the tax rate are. Note also that in the above solution, the
multiplier '2t; the output gap, and the tax rate all follow unit root processes:
a temporary disturbance to the ¯scal stress permanently changes the level
of each of these variables, as in the analysis of the optimal dynamics of the
tax rate in Barro (1979) and Bohn (1990). However, the optimal evolution
of the tax rate is not in general a pure random walk as in the analysis of
Barro and Bohn. Instead, the tax gap is an IMA(1,1) process, as in the local
analysis of Aiyagari et al. (2002); the optimal tax rate ^ ¿t may have more
complex dynamics, in the case that ^ ¿¤
t exhibits stationary °uctuations. In
the special case of linear utility (¾¡1 = 0), n' = 0; and both the output
gap and the tax gap follow random walks (as both co-move with '2t). If the
only disturbances are ¯scal disturbances ( ^ Gt and ^ ³t), then there are also no
°uctuations in ^ ¿¤
t in this case, so that the optimal tax rate follows a random
walk.
More generally, we observe that optimal policy \smooths" '2t; the value
(in units of marginal utility) of additional government revenue in period t, so
that it follows a random walk. This is the proper generalization of the Barro
tax-smoothing result, though it only implies smoothing of tax rates in fairly
special cases. We ¯nd a similar result in the case that prices are sticky, even
when government debt is not indexed, as we now show.
27The initial condition for '2;t0¡1 is in turn chosen so that the solution obtained is
consistent with the initial constraint yt0 = ¹ yt0: Under policy that is optimal from a time-
less perspective, this initial commitment is in turn chosen in a self-consistent fashion, as
discussed further in section 5. Note that the speci¯cation of '2;t0¡1 does not a®ect our
conclusions about the optimal responses to shocks, emphasized in this section.
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Sticky Prices
We turn now to the characterization of the optimal responses to shocks in
the case that prices are sticky (® > 0). The optimization problem that
provides a ¯rst-order characterization of optimal responses in this case is
that of choosing processes f¼t;yt; ^ ¿t;^ btg from date t0 onward to minimize
(3.4), subject to the constraints (3.7) and (3.9) for each t ¸ t0, together with
initial constraints of the form
¼t0 = ¹ ¼t0; yt0 = ¹ yt0;
given the initial condition ^ bt0¡1 and the exogenous evolution of the composite
disturbances f^ ¿¤
















¡1¼t + yt + Ã^ ¿t + ·
¡1¯¼t+1] +
+'2t[^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ ¾
¡1yt ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(byyt + b¿^ ¿t) ¡ ¯(^ bt ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ ¾
¡1yt+1)]g
+[·
¡1'1;t0¡1 + '2;t0¡1]¼t0 + ¾
¡1'2;t0yt0;
by analogy with (4.3).
The ¯rst-order condition with respect to ¼t is given by
q¼¼t = ·
¡1('1t ¡ '1;t¡1) + ('2t ¡ '2;t¡1); (5.1)
that with respect to yt is given by
qyyt = ¡'1t + [(1 ¡ ¯)by + ¾
¡1]'2t ¡ ¾
¡1'2;t¡1; (5.2)
that with respect to ^ ¿t is given by
Ã'1t = (1 ¡ ¯)b¿'2t; (5.3)
and ¯nally that with respect to ^ bt is given by
'2t = Et'2;t+1: (5.4)
These together with the two structural equations and the initial conditions
are to be solved for the state-contingent paths of f¼t; ^ Yt;¿t;^ bt;'1t;'2tg: Note
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model with indexed debt; the ¯rst condition (5.1) replaces the previous re-
quirement that ¼t = 0: Hence the solution obtained in the previous section
corresponds to a limiting case of this problem, in which q¼ is made unbound-
edly large; for this reason the discussion above of the more familiar case with
°exible prices and riskless indexed government debt provides insight into the
character of optimal policy in the present case as well.
In the unique bounded solution to these equations, the dynamics of gov-




~ mb + nb
'2;t¡1 ¡
1
~ mb + nb
[ft +^ bt¡1];
^ bt = ¡Etft+1 ¡ nb'2t;
though the coe±cient ~ mb now di®ers from mb, in a way also described in the
appendix. The implied dynamics of in°ation and output gap are then given
by
¼t = ¡!'('2t ¡ '2;t¡1); (5.5)
yt = m''2t + n''2;t¡1; (5.6)
where m';n' are de¯ned as before, and !' is de¯ned in the appendix. The
optimal dynamics of the tax rate are those required to make these in°ation
and output-gap dynamics consistent with the aggregate-supply relation (3.7).
Once again, the optimal dynamics of in°ation, the output gap, and the pub-
lic debt depend only on the evolution of the ¯scal stress variable fftg; the
dynamics of the tax rate also depend on the evolution of f^ ¿¤
t g.
We now discuss the optimal response of the variables to a disturbance to
the level of ¯scal stress. The laws of motion just derived for government debt
and the Lagrange multiplier imply that temporary disturbances to the level
of ¯scal stress cause a permanent change in the level of both the Lagrange
multiplier and the public debt. This then implies a permanent change in the
level of output as well, which in turn requires (since in°ation is stationary) a
permanent change in the level of the tax rate. Since in°ation is proportional
to the change in the Lagrange multiplier, the price level moves in proportion
to the multiplier, which means a temporary disturbance to the ¯scal stress
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Figure 1: Impulse response of the public debt to a pure ¯scal shock, for
alternative degrees of price stickiness.
results in a permanent change in the price level, as in the °exible-price case
analyzed in the previous section. Thus in this case, the price level, output
gap, government debt, and tax rate all have unit roots, combining features
of the two special cases considered in the previous section.28 Both price
level and '2t are random walks. They jump immediately to new permanent
level in response to change in ¯scal stress. In the case of purely transitory
(white noise) disturbances, government debt also jumps immediately to a
new permanent level. Given the dynamics of the price level and government
debt, the dynamics of output and tax rate then jointly determined by the
aggregate-supply relation and the government budget constraint.
We further ¯nd that the degree to which ¯scal stress is relieved by a
28Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2001) similarly observe that in a model with sticky prices,
the optimal response of the tax rate is similar to what would be optimal in a °exible-price
model with riskless indexed government debt.
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Figure 2: Impulse response of the tax rate to a pure ¯scal shock.
price-level jump (as in the °exible-price, nominal-debt case) as opposed to
an increase in government debt and hence a permanently higher tax rate
(as in the °exible-price, indexed-debt case) depends on the degree of price
stickiness. We illustrate this with a numerical example. We calibrate a
quarterly model by assuming that ¯ = 0:99;! = 0:473;¾¡1 = 0:157; and · =
0:0236; in accordance with the estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
We furthermore assume an elasticity of substitution among alternative goods
of µ = 10, an overall level of steady-state distortions © = 1=3; a steady-state
tax rate of ¹ ¿ = 0:2; and a steady-state debt level ¹ b=¹ Y = 2:4 (debt equal
to 60 percent of a year's GDP). Given the assumed degree of market power
of producers (a steady-state gross price markup of 1.11) and the assumed
size of the tax wedge, the value © = 1=3 corresponds to a steady-state wage
markup of ¹ ¹w = 1:08: If we assume that there are no government transfers in
the steady state, then the assumed level of tax revenues net of debt service
would ¯nance steady-state government purchases equal to a share sG = 0:176
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Figure 3: Impulse response of the in°ation rate to a pure ¯scal shock.
Let us suppose that the economy is disturbed by an exogenous increase in
transfer programs ^ ³t, equal to one percent of aggregate output, and expected
to last only for the current quarter. Figure 1 shows the optimal impulse
response of the government debt ^ bt to this shock (where quarter zero is the
quarter of the shock), for each of 7 di®erent values for ·; the slope of the
short-run aggregate-supply relation, maintaining the values just stated for
the other parameters of the model. The solid line indicates the optimal
response in the case of our baseline value for ·, based on the estimates of
Rotemberg and Woodford; the other cases represent progressively greater
degrees of price °exibility, up to the limiting case of fully °exible prices (the
case · = 1). Figures 2 and 3 similarly show the optimal responses of the
tax rate and the in°ation rate to the same disturbance, for each of the same
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7 cases.29
29In ¯gure 1, a response of 1 means a one percent increase in the value of bt; from 60
percent to 60.6 percent of a year's GDP. In ¯gure 2, a response of 1 means a one percent
decrease in ¿t, from 20 percent to 20.2 percent. In ¯gure 3, a response of 1 means a one
percent per annum increase in the in°ation rate, or an increase of the price level from 1
to 1.0025 over the course of a quarter (given that our model is quarterly). The responses
reported in Table 1 are measured in the same way.Table 1: Immediate responses for alternative degrees of price stickiness.
· T ^ ¿1 ¼0
.024 29 .072 .021
.05 20 .076 .024
.10 14 .077 .030
.25 9 .078 .044
1.0 5.4 .075 .113
25 2.4 .032 .998
1 0 0 1.651
We see that the volatility of both in°ation and tax rates under optimal
policy depends greatly on the degree of stickiness of prices. Table 1 reports
the initial quarter's response of the in°ation rate, and the long-run response
of the tax rate, for each of the 7 cases. The table also indicates for each case
the implied average time (in weeks) between price changes, T ´ (¡log®)¡1;
where 0 < ® < 1 is the fraction of prices unchanged for an entire quarter im-
plied by the assumed value of ·.30 We ¯rst note that our baseline calibration
implies that price changes occur only slightly less frequently than twice per
year, which is consistent with survey evidence.31 Next, we observe that even
were we to assume an aggregate-supply relation several times as steep as the
30We have used the relation between ® and T for a continuous-time version of the Calvo
model in order to express the degree of price stickiness in terms of an average time between
price changes.
31The indicated average time between price changes for the baseline case is shorter than
that reported in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), both because we here assume a slightly
larger value of µ; implying a smaller value of ®; and because of the continuous-time method
used here to convert ® into an implied average time interval.
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optimal responses of the (long-run) tax rate and the in°ation rate would be
fairly similar. At the same time, the optimal responses with fully °exible
prices are quite di®erent: the response of in°ation is 80 times as large as
under the baseline sticky-price calibration (implying a variance of in°ation
6400 times as large), while the long-run tax rate does not respond at all in
the °exible-price case.32 But even a small degree of stickiness of prices makes
a dramatic di®erence in the optimal responses; for example, if prices are re-
vised only every ¯ve weeks on average, the variance of in°ation is reduced
by a factor of more than 200, while the optimal response of the long-run
tax rate to the increased revenue need is nearly the same size as under the
baseline degree of price stickiness. Thus we ¯nd, as do Schmitt-Groh¶ e and
Uribe (2001) in the context of a calibrated model with convex costs of price
adjustment, that the conclusions of the °exible-price analysis are quite mis-
leading if prices are even slightly sticky. Under a realistic calibration of the
degree of price stickiness, in°ation should be quite stable, even in response
to disturbances with substantial consequences for the government's budget
constraint, while tax rates should instead respond substantially (and with a
unit root) to variations in ¯scal stress.
We can also compare our results with those that arise when taxes are
lump-sum. In this case, Ã = 0; and the ¯rst-order condition (5.3) requires




for each t ¸ t0 as in Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003, chapter 7).
In this case the ¯scal stress is no longer relevant for in°ation or output-gap
32The tax rate does respond in the quarter of the shock in the case of °exible prices,
but with the opposite sign to that associated with optimal policy under our baseline
calibration. Under °exible prices, as discussed above, the tax rate does not respond to
variations in ¯scal stress at all. Because the increase in government transfers raises the
optimal level of output ^ Y ¤
0 ; for reasons explained in the appendix, the optimal tax rate ^ ¿¤
0
actually falls, in order to induce equilibrium output to increase; and under °exible prices,
this is the optimal response of ^ ¿0:
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plete stabilization. The determinants of the cost-push e®ects of underlying
disturbances, and of the target output level ^ Y ¤
t are also somewhat di®erent,
because in this case #1 = 0: For example, a pure ¯scal shock has no cost-push
e®ect, nor any e®ect on ^ Y ¤
t , and hence no e®ect on the optimal evolution of
either in°ation or output.33 Furthermore, as shown in the references just
mentioned, the price level no longer follows a random walk; instead, it is a
stationary variable. Increases in the price level due to a cost-push shock are
subsequently undone by period of de°ation.
Note that the familiar case from the literature on monetary stabilization
policy does not result simply from assuming that sources of revenue that do
not shift the aggregate-supply relation are available; it is also important that
the sort of tax that does shift the AS relation (like the sales tax here) is not
available. We could nest both the standard model and our present baseline
case within a single, more general framework by assuming that revenue can
be raised using either the sales tax or a lump-sum tax, but that there is an
additional convex cost (perhaps representing \collection costs", assumed to
reduce the utility of the representative household but not using real resources)
of increases in either tax rate. The standard case would then appear as the
limiting case of this model in which the collection costs associated with the
sales tax are in¯nite, while those associated with the lump-sum tax are zero;
the baseline model here would correspond to an alternative limiting case
in which the collection costs associated with the lump-sum tax are in¯nite,
while those associated with the sales tax are zero. In intermediate cases, we
would continue to ¯nd that ¯scal stress a®ects the optimal evolution of both
in°ation and the output gap, as long as there is a positive collection cost for
the lump-sum tax. At the same time, the result that the shadow value of
additional government revenue follows a random walk under optimal policy
(which would still be true) will not in general imply, as it does here, that
the price level should also be a random walk; for the perfect co-movement
of '1t and '2t that characterizes optimal policy in our baseline case will not
be implied by the ¯rst-order conditions except in the case that there are no
33See Benigno and Woodford (2003) for detailed analysis of the determinants of ut and
^ Y ¤
t in this case.
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will generally contain a unit root under optimal policy, even if it will not
generally follow a random walk.
We also obtain results more similar to those in the standard literature
on monetary stabilization policy if we assume (realistically) that it is not
possible to adjust tax rates on such short notice in response to shocks as
is possible with monetary policy. As a simple way of introducing delays in
the adjustment of tax policy, suppose that the tax rate ¿t has to be ¯xed in
period t ¡ d. In this case, the ¯rst-order conditions characterizing optimal
responses to shocks are the same as above, except that (5.3) is replaced by
ÃEt'1;t+d = (1 ¡ ¯)b¿Et'2;t+d (5.7)
for each t ¸ t0: In this case, the ¯rst-order conditions imply that Et¼t+d+1 =
0; but no longer imply that changes in the price level must be unforecastable
from one period to the next. As a result, price-level increases in response to
disturbances are typically partially, but not completely, undone in subsequent
periods. Yet there continues to be a unit root in the price level (of at least
a small innovation variance), even in the case of an arbitrarily long delay d
in the adjustment of tax rates.
6 Optimal Targeting Rules for Monetary and
Fiscal Policy
We now wish to characterize the policy rules that the monetary and ¯scal
authorities can follow in order to bring about the state-contingent responses
to shocks described in the previous section. One might think that it su±ces
to solve for the optimal state-contingent paths for the policy instruments.
But in general this is not a desirable approach to the speci¯cation of a policy
rule, as discussed in Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2003, chapter 7). A
description of optimal policy in these terms would require enumeration of
all of the types of shocks that might be encountered later, inde¯nitely far
in the future, which is not feasible in practice. A commitment to a state-
contingent instrument path, even when possible, also may not determine the
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consistent with this policy; many other (much less desirable) equilibria may
also be consistent with the same state-contingent instrument path.
Instead, we here specify targeting rules in the sense of Svensson (1999,
2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003). These targeting rules are commit-
ments on the part of the policy authorities to adjust their respective instru-
ments so as to ensure that the projected paths of the endogenous variables
satisfy certain target criteria. We show that under an appropriate choice of
these target criteria, a commitment to ensure that they hold at all times will
determine a unique non-explosive rational-expectations equilibrium, in which
the state-contingent evolution of in°ation, output and the tax rate solves the
optimization problem discussed in the previous section. Moreover, we show
that it is possible to obtain a speci¯cation of the policy rules that is robust
to alternative speci¯cations of the exogenous shock processes.
We apply the general approach of Giannoni and Woodford (2002), which
allows the derivation of optimal target criteria with the properties just stated.
In addition, Giannoni and Woodford show that such target criteria can be
formulated that refer only to the projected paths of the target variables (the
ones in terms of which the stabilization objectives of policy are de¯ned |
here, in°ation and the output gap). Brie°y, the method involves constructing
the target criteria by eliminating the Lagrange multipliers from the system
of the system of ¯rst-order conditions that characterize the optimal state-
contingent evolution, regardless of character of the (additive) disturbances.
We are left with linear relations among the target variables, that do not
involve the disturbances and with coe±cients independent of the speci¯cation
of the disturbances, that represent the desired target criteria.
Recall that the ¯rst-order conditions that characterize the optimal state-
contingent paths in the problem considered in the previous section are given
by (5.1) { (5.4). As explained in the previous section, the ¯rst three of
these conditions imply that the evolution of in°ation and of the output gap
must satisfy (5.5) { (5.6) each period. We can solve (5.5) { (5.6) for the
values of '2t;'2;t¡1 implied by the values of ¼t;yt that are observed in an
optimal equilibrium. We can then replace '2;t¡1 in these two relations by
the multiplier implied in this way by observed values of ¼t¡1;yt¡1: Finally,
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(yt ¡ yt¡1) = 0: (6.1)
This target criterion has the form of a \°exible in°ation target," similar to
the optimal target criterion for monetary policy in model with lump-sum
taxation (Woodford, 2003, chapter 7). It is interesting to note that, as in
all of the examples of optimal target criteria for monetary policy derived
under varying assumptions in Giannoni and Woodford (2003), it is only the
projected rate of change of the output gap that matters for determining the
appropriate adjustment of the near-term in°ation target; the absolute level
of the output gap is irrelevant.
The remaining ¯rst-order condition from the previous section, not used in
the derivation of (6.1), is (5.4). By similarly using the solutions for '2;t+1;'2t
implied by observations of ¼t+1;yt+1 to substitute for the multipliers in this
condition, one obtains a further target criterion
Et¼t+1 = 0 (6.2)
(Note that the fact that this always holds in the optimal equilibrium | i.e.,
that the price level must follow a random walk | has already been noted in
the previous section.) We show in the appendix that policies that ensure that
(6.1) { (6.2) hold for all t ¸ t0 determine a unique non-explosive rational-
expectations equilibrium.
Moreover, this equilibrium solves the above ¯rst-order conditions for a
particular speci¯cation of the initial lagged multipliers '1;t0¡1;'2;t0¡1, which
are inferred from the initial values ¼t0¡1;yt0¡1 in the way just explained.
Hence this equilibrium minimizes expected discounted losses (3.4) given ^ bt0¡1
and subject to constraints on initial outcomes of the form
¼t0 = ¹ ¼(¼t0¡1;yt0¡1); (6.3)
yt0 = ¹ y(¼t0¡1;yt0¡1): (6.4)
Furthermore, these constraints are self-consistent in the sense that the equi-
librium that solves this problem is one in which ¼t;yt are chosen to satisfy
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rules are optimal from a timeless perspective.34 And they are optimal re-
gardless of the speci¯cation of disturbance processes. Thus we have obtained
robustly optimal target criteria, as desired.
We have established a pair of target criteria with the property that if they
are expected to be jointly satis¯ed each period, the resulting equilibrium in-
volves the optimal responses to shocks. This result in itself, however, does
not establish which policy instrument should be used to ensure satisfaction
of which criterion. Since the variables referred to in both criteria can be
a®ected by both monetary and ¯scal policy, there is not a uniquely appropri-
ate answer to that question. However, the following represents a relatively
simple example of a way in which such a regime could be institutionalized
through separate targeting procedures on the part of monetary and ¯scal
authorities.
Let the central bank be assigned the task of maximizing social welfare
through its adjustment of the level of short-term interest rates, taking as
given the state-contingent evolution of the public debt f^ btg, which depends
on the decisions of the ¯scal authority. Thus the central bank treats the
evolution of the public debt as being outside its control, just like the exoge-
nous disturbances f»tg; and simply seeks to forecast its evolution in order to
correctly model the constraints on its own policy. Here we do not propose a
regime under which it is actually true that the evolution of the public debt
would be una®ected by a change in monetary policy. But there is no in-
consistency in the central bank's assumption (since a given bounded process
f^ btg will continue to represent a feasible ¯scal policy regardless of the policy
adopted by the central bank), and we shall show that the conduct of policy
under this assumption does not lead to a suboptimal outcome, as long as the
state-contingent evolution of the public debt is correctly forecasted by the
central bank.
The central bank then seeks to bring about paths for f¼t;yt; ^ ¿tg from date
t0 onward that minimize (3.4), subject to the constraints (3.7) and (3.9) for
each t ¸ t0, together with initial constraints of the form (6.3) { (6.4), given
34See Woodford (2003, chapters 7, 8) for further discussion of the self-consistency con-
dition that the initial constraints are required to satisfy.
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t ;ft;^ btg. The ¯rst-order conditions for this
optimization problem are given by (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4) each period, which in
turn imply that (6.1) must hold each period, as shown above. One can further
show that a commitment by the central bank to ensure that (6.1) holds each
period determines the equilibrium evolution that solves this problem, in the
case of an appropriate (self-consistent) choice of the initial constraints (6.3) {
(6.4). Thus (6.1) is an optimal target criterion for a policy authority seeking
to solve the kind of problem just posed; and since the problem takes as given
the evolution of the public debt, it is obviously a more suitable assignment
for the central bank than for the ¯scal authority. The kind of interest-rate
reaction function that can be used to implement a \°exible in°ation target"
of this kind is discussed in Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford
(2003, chapter 7).
Correspondingly, let the ¯scal authority be assigned the task of choos-
ing the level of government revenue each period that will maximize social
welfare, taking as given the state-contingent evolution of output fytg, which
it regards as being determined by monetary policy. (Again, it need not re-
ally be the case that the central bank ensures a particular state-contingent
path of output, regardless of what the ¯scal authority does. But again, this
assumption is not inconsistent with our model of the economy, since it is
possible for the central bank to bring about any bounded process fytg that
it wishes, regardless of ¯scal policy, in the case that prices are sticky.) If
the ¯scal authority regards the evolution of output as outside its control, its








But this is a possible objective for ¯scal policy, given the e®ects of tax policy
on in°ation dynamics (when taxes are not lump-sum) indicated by (3.7).









T¡t(^ ¿T ¡ ^ ¿
¤
T): (6.6)
Thus what matters about ¯scal policy for current in°ation determination is
the present value of expected tax rates; but this in turn is constrained by
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present value of taxes in (6.6), we obtain a relation of the form
¼t = ¹1[^ bt¡1 ¡ ¾





for certain coe±cients ¹1;¹2 > 0 de¯ned in the appendix. If the ¯scal au-
thority takes the evolution of output as given, then this relation implies that
its policy in period t can have no e®ect on ¼t. However, it can a®ect in°ation
in the following period through the e®ects the current government budget
on ^ bt. Furthermore, since the choice of ^ bt has no e®ect on in°ation in later
periods (given that it places no constraint on the level of public debt that
may be chosen in later periods), ^ bt should be chosen so as to minimize Et¼2
t+1:
The ¯rst-order condition for the optimal choice of ^ bt is then simply (6.2),
which we ¯nd is indeed a suitable target criterion for the ¯scal authority.
The decision rule implied by this target criterion is seen to be






which expresses the optimal level of government borrowing as a function of
the ¯scal authority's projections of the exogenous determinants of ¯scal stress
and of future real activity. It is clearly possible for the ¯scal authority to
implement this target criterion, and doing so leads to a determinate equi-
librium path for in°ation, given the path of output. We thus obtain a pair
of targeting rules, one for the central bank and one for the ¯scal authority,
that if both pursued will implement an equilibrium that is optimal from a
timeless perspective. Furthermore, each individual rule can be rationalized
as a solution to a constrained optimization problem that the particular policy
authority is assigned to solve.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to jointly analyze optimal monetary and
¯scal policy within a single framework. The two problems, often considered in
isolation, turn out to be more closely related than might have been expected.
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be chosen to serve the same objectives as those emphasized in the literature
on monetary stabilization policy: stabilization of in°ation and of a (properly
de¯ned) output gap. A single output gap can be de¯ned that measures the
total distortion of the level of economic activity, resulting both from the
stickiness of prices (and the consequent variation in markups) and from the
supply-side e®ects of tax distortions. It is this cumulative gap that one wishes
to stabilize, rather than the individual components resulting from the two
sources; and both monetary policy and tax policy can be used to a®ect it.
Both monetary policy and tax policy also matter for in°ation determination
in our model, because of the e®ects of the tax rate on real marginal cost and
hence on the aggregate-supply relation. Indeed, we have exhibited a pair
of robustly optimal targeting rules for the monetary and ¯scal authorities
respectively, under which both authorities consider the consequences of their
actions for near-term in°ation projections in determining how to adjust their
instruments.
And not only should the ¯scal authority use tax policy to serve the tra-
ditional goals of monetary stabilization policy; we also ¯nd that the mon-
etary authority should take account of the consequences of its actions for
the government budget. In the present model, that abstracts entirely from
transactions frictions, these consequences have solely to do with the implica-
tions of alternative price-level and interest-rate paths for the real burden of
interest payments on the public debt, and not any contribution of seignor-
age to government revenues. Nonetheless, under a calibration of our model
that assumes a debt burden and a level of distorting taxes that would not
be unusual for an advanced industrial economy, taking account of the ex-
istence of a positive shadow value of additional government revenue (owing
to the non-existence of lump-sum taxes) makes a material di®erence for the
quantitative characterization of optimal monetary policy. In fact, we have
found that the crucial summary statistic that indicates the degree to which
various types of real disturbances should be allowed to a®ect short-run pro-
jections for either in°ation or the output gap is not the degree to which these
disturbances shift the aggregate-supply curve for a given tax rate (i.e., the
extent to which they represent \cost-push" shocks), but rather the degree to
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condition).
Our conclusion that monetary policy should take account of the require-
ments for government solvency does not imply anything as strong as the
result of Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a °exible-price economy with nominal
government debt, according to which surprise variations in the in°ation rate
should be used to completely o®set variations in ¯scal stress, so that tax
rates need not vary (other than as necessary to stabilize the output gap).
We ¯nd that in the case of even a modest degree of price stickiness | much
less than what seems to be consistent with empirical evidence for the U.S. |
it is not optimal for in°ation to respond to variations in ¯scal stress by more
than a tiny fraction of the amount that would be required to eliminate the
¯scal stress (and that would be optimal with fully °exible prices); instead,
a substantial part of the adjustment should come through a change in the
tax rate. But the way in which the acceptable short-run in°ation projection
should be a®ected by variations in the projected output gap is substantially
di®erent in an economy with only distorting taxes than would be the case
in the presence of lump-sum taxation. For with distorting taxes, the avail-
able tradeo® between variations in in°ation and in the output gap depends
not only on the way these variables are related to one another through the
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A.1 Derivation of the aggregate-supply relation (equa-
tion (2.11))
In this section, we derive equation (2.11) in the main text and we de¯ne the
variables Ft and Kt: In the Calvo model, a supplier that changes its price in











where ®T¡t is the probability that the price set at time t remains ¯xed in
period T, Qt;T is the stochastic discount factor given by (2.7), and the pro¯t
function ¦(¢) is de¯ned as
¦(p;p
j;P;Y;¿;») ´ (1¡¿)pY (p=P)
¡µ¡¹
w~ vh(f¡1(Y (pj=P)¡µ=A);»)






Here Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition implies that the individual
supplier faces a demand curve each period of the form
yt(i) = Yt(pt(i)=Pt)
¡µ;
so that after-tax sales revenues are the function of p given in the ¯rst term
on the right-hand side of (A.8). The second term indicates the nominal wage
bill, obtained by inverting the production function to obtain the required
labor input, and multiplying this by the industry wage for sector j. The
industry wage is obtained from the labor supply equation (2.8), under the
assumption that each of the ¯rms in industry j (other than i, assumed to
have a negligible e®ect on industry labor demand) charges the common price
pj: (Because all ¯rms in a given industry are assumed to adjust their prices
at the same time, in equilibrium the prices of ¯rms in a given industry are
always identical. We must nonetheless de¯ne the pro¯t function for the
case in which ¯rm i deviates from the industry price, in order to determine
whether the industry price is optimal for each individual ¯rm.)
We note that supplier i's pro¯ts are a concave function of the quantity
sold yt(i); since revenues are proportional to y
µ¡1
µ
t (i) and hence concave in
48
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 345
April 2004yt(i), while costs are convex in yt(i). Moreover, since yt(i) is proportional to
pt(i)¡µ; the pro¯t function is also concave in pt(i)¡µ. The ¯rst-order condition
for the optimal choice of the price pt(i) is the same as the one with respect to
pt(i)¡µ; hence the ¯rst-order condition with respect to pt(i) is both necessary
and su±cient for an optimum.
































u(Yt;»t) ´ ~ u(Yt ¡ Gt;»t);
v(yt(i);»t) ´ ~ v(f
¡1(yt(i)=At);»t) = ~ v(Ht(i);»t);




t, the common price of all goods with prices revised at date t,

























































Using the isoelastic functional forms given in the text, we obtain a closed-
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and where in the function k(¢), the vector of shocks has been extended to
include the shock ¹w











yields a short-run aggregate-supply relation between in°ation and output of
the form (2.11) in the text.
A.2 Recursive formulation of the policy problem
Under the standard (Ramsey) approach to the characterization of an optimal
policy commitment, one chooses among state-contingent paths f¦t;Yt;¿t;bt;¢tg





















st ´ ¿tYt ¡ Gt ¡ ³t (A.19)
for each t ¸ t0; given initial government debt bt0¡1 and price dispersion ¢t0¡1;
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the law of motion
¢t = ®¢t¡1¦
µ(1+!)










which can be written in the form (A.17); this is the origin of that constraint.
We now show that the t0¡optimal plan (Ramsey problem) can be ob-






T¡t~ uc(YT ¡ GT;»T)sT;
and let F be the set of values for (bt¡1;¢t¡1;Ft;Kt;Wt) such that there exist
paths f¦T;YT;¿T;bT;¢Tg for dates T ¸ t that satisfy (A.16), (A.17) and
(A.18) for each T, that are consistent with the speci¯ed values for Ft;Kt; de-
¯ned in (A.23) and (A.24), and Wt; and that imply a well-de¯ned value for the
objective Ut de¯ned in (A.20). Furthermore, for any (bt¡1;¢t¡1;Ft;Kt;Wt) 2
F; let V (bt¡1;¢t¡1;Xt;»t) denote the maximum attainable value of Ut among
the state-contingent paths that satisfy the constraints just mentioned, where




~ uc(Yt ¡ Gt;»t); (A.22)
in order for (A.18) to be satis¯ed. Thus a speci¯ed value for Wt implies a
restriction on the possible values of ¦t and Yt, given the predetermined real
debt bt¡1 and the exogenous disturbances.
The two-stage optimization problem is the following. In the ¯rst stage,
values of the endogenous variables xt0, where xt ´ (¦t;Yt;¿t;bt;¢t), and
state-contingent commitments Xt0+1(»t0+1) for the following period, are cho-
sen so as to maximize an objective de¯ned below. In the second stage, the
equilibrium evolution from period t0 + 1 onward is chosen to solve the max-
imization problem that de¯nes the value function V (bt0;¢t0;Xt0+1;»t0+1),
35As stated in the text, in our notation for the value function V; »t denotes not simply
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associated with that state.
In de¯ning the objective for the ¯rst stage of this equivalent formulation
of the Ramsey problem, it is useful to let ¦(F;K) denote the value of ¦t that
solves (A.16) for given values of Ft and Kt, and to let s(x;») denote the real
primary surplus st de¯ned by (A.19) in the case of given values of xt and »t.
We also de¯ne the functional relationships
^ J[x;X(¢)](»t) ´ U(Yt;¢t;»t) + ¯EtV (bt;¢t;Xt+1;»t+1);
^ F[x;X(¢)](»t) ´ (1 ¡ ¿t)f(Yt;»t) + ®¯Etf¦(Ft+1;Kt+1)
µ¡1Ft+1g;
^ K[x;X(¢)](»t) ´ k(Yt;»t) + ®¯Etf¦(Ft+1;Kt+1)
µ(1+!)Kt+1g;
^ W[x;X(¢)](»t) ´ ~ uc(Yt ¡ Gt;»t)s(xt;»t) + ¯EtWt+1;
where f(Y ;») and k(Y ;») are de¯ned in (A.13) and (A.14).
Then in the ¯rst stage, xt0 and Xt0+1(¢) are chosen so as to maximize
^ J[xt0;Xt0+1(¢)](»t0) (A.23)
over values of xt0 and Xt0+1(¢) such that
(i) ¦t0 and ¢t0 satisfy (A.17);
(ii) the values
Ft0 = ^ F[xt0;Xt0+1(¢)](»t0); (A.24)
Kt0 = ^ K[xt0;Xt0+1(¢)](»t0) (A.25)
satisfy
¦t0 = ¦(Ft0;Kt0); (A.26)
(iii) the value
Wt0 = ^ W[xt0;Xt0+1(¢)](»t0) (A.27)
satis¯es (A.22) for t = t0; and
(iv) the choices (bt0;¢t0;Xt0+1) 2 F for each possible state of the world
»t0+1.
These constraints imply that the objective ^ J[xt0;Xt0+1(¢)](»t0) is well-
de¯ned, and that values (xt0;Xt0+1(¢)) are chosen for which the stage two
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riod t0 +1: Furthermore, in the case of any stage-one choices consistent with
the above constraints, and any subsequent evolution consistent with the con-
straints of the stage-two problem, (A.26) implies that (A.16) is satis¯ed in
period t0; while (A.22) implies that (A.18) is satis¯ed in period t0: Con-
straint (i) above implies that (A.17) is also satis¯ed in period t0: Finally,
the constraints of the stage-two problem imply that both (A.16), (A.17) and
(A.18) are satis¯ed in each period t ¸ t0+1; thus the state-contingent evolu-
tion that solves the two-stage problem is a rational-expectations equilibrium.
Conversely, one can show that any possible rational-expectations equilibrium
satis¯es all of these constraints.
One can then reformulate the Ramsey problem, replacing the set of re-
quirements for rational-expectations equilibrium by the stage-one constraints
plus the stage-two constraints. Since no aspect of the evolution from period
t0 + 1 onward, other than the speci¯cation of Xt0+1(¢), a®ects the stage-one
constraints, the optimization problem decomposes into the two stages de¯ned
above, where the objective (A.23) corresponds to the maximization of Ut0 in
the ¯rst stage.
The optimization problem in stage two of this reformulation of the Ram-
sey problem is of the same form as the Ramsey problem itself, except that
there are additional constraints associated with the precommitted values for
the elements of Xt0+1(»t0+1): Let us consider a problem like the Ramsey
problem just de¯ned, looking forward from some period t0; except under the
constraints that the quantities Xt0 must take certain given values, where
(bt0¡1;¢t0¡1;Xt0) 2 F: This constrained problem can similarly be expressed
as a two-stage problem of the same form as above, with an identical stage two
problem to the one described above. The stage one problem is also identical
to stage one of the Ramsey problem, except that now the plan chosen in stage
one must be consistent with the given values Xt0; so that conditions (A.24),
(A.25) and (A.27) are now added to the constraints on the possible choices
of (xt0;Xt0+1(¢)) in stage one. (The stipulation that (bt0¡1;¢t0¡1;Xt0) 2 F
implies that the constraint set remains non-empty despite these additional
restrictions.)
Stage two of this constrained problem is thus of exactly the same form as
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can be decomposed into an in¯nite sequence of problems, in which in each
period t, (xt;Xt+1(¢)) are chosen to maximize ^ J[xt;Xt+1(¢)](»t), given the
predetermined state variables (bt¡1;¢t¡1) and the precommitted values Xt;
subject to the constraints that
(i) ¦t is given by (A.26), Yt is then given by (A.22), and ¢t is given by
(A.17);
(ii) the precommitted values Xt are ful¯lled, i.e.,
^ F[xt;Xt+1(¢)](»t) = Ft; (A.28)
^ K[xt;Xt+1(¢)](»t) = Kt; (A.29)
^ W[xt;Xt+1(¢)](»t) = Wt; (A.30)
and
(iii) the choices (bt;¢t;Xt+1) 2 F for each possible state of the world
»t+1.
Our aim in the paper is to provide a local characterization of policy that
solves this recursive optimization, in the event of small enough disturbances,
and initial conditions (bt0¡1;¢t0¡1;Xt) 2 F that are close enough to consis-
tency with the steady state characterized in the next section of this appendix.
A.3 The deterministic steady state
Here we show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal policy (under
appropriate initial conditions) of the `recursive policy problem just de¯ned
that involves constant values of all variables. We now consider a deterministic
problem in which the exogenous disturbances ¹ Ct, Gt, ¹ Ht, At, ¹w
t , ³t each take
constant values ¹ C, ¹ H, ¹ A, ¹ ¹w > 0 and ¹ G; ¹ ³ ¸ 0 for all t ¸ t0, and we start
from initial conditions bt0¡1 = ¹ b > 0. (The value of ¹ b is arbitrary, subject to
an upper bound discussed below.) We wish to ¯nd an initial degree of price
dispersion ¢t0¡1 and initial commitments Xt0 = ¹ X such that the recursive
(or \stage two") problem involves a constant policy xt0 = ¹ x, Xt+1 = ¹ X each
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subject to the constraints
Ktp(¦t)
1+!µ
µ¡1 = Ft; (A.32)
Ft = (1 ¡ ¿t)f(Yt) + ®¯¦
µ¡1
t+1Ft+1; (A.33)
Kt = k(Yt) + ®¯¦
µ(1+!)
t+1 Kt+1; (A.34)





















We introduce Lagrange multipliers Á1t through Á6t corresponding to con-
straints (A.32) through (A.37) respectively. We also introduce multipliers
dated t0 corresponding to the constraints implied by the initial conditions
Xt0 = ¹ X; the latter multipliers are normalized in such a way that the ¯rst-
order conditions take the same form at date t0 as at all later dates. The
¯rst-order conditions of the maximization problem are then the following.
The one with respect to Yt is
Uy(Yt;¢t) ¡ (1 ¡ ¿t)fy(Yt)Á2t ¡ ky(Yt)Á3t ¡ ¿tfy(Yt)Á4t+
+ucc(Yt)( ¹ G + ¹ ³)Á4t ¡ ucc(Yt)bt¡1¦
¡1
t Á5t = 0; (A.38)
that with respect to ¢t is
U¢(Yt;¢t) + Á6t ¡ ®¯¦
µ(1+!)
t+1 Á6;t+1 = 0; (A.39)
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µ¡1 p¼(¦t)Á6t = 0;
(A.40)
that with respect to ¿t is
Á2t ¡ Á4t = 0; (A.41)
that with respect to Ft is
¡Á1t + Á2t ¡ ®¦
µ¡1
t Á2;t¡1 = 0; (A.42)
that with respect to Kt is
p(¦t)
1+!µ
µ¡1 Á1t + Á3t ¡ ®¦
µ(1+!)
t Á3;t¡1 = 0; (A.43)
that with respect to Wt is
Á4t ¡ Á4;t¡1 + Á5t = 0; (A.44)
and ¯nally, that with respect to bt is
Á5t = 0: (A.45)
We search for a solution to these ¯rst-order conditions in which ¦t = ¹ ¦;
¢t = ¹ ¢; Yt = ¹ Y , ¿t = ¹ ¿ and bt = ¹ b at all times. A steady-state solution
of this kind also requires that the Lagrange multipliers take constant values.
We furthermore conjecture the existence of a solution in which ¹ ¦ = 1; as
stated in the text. Note that such a solution implies that ¹ ¢ = 1; p(¹ ¦) = 1;
p¼(¹ ¦) = ¡(µ ¡ 1)®=(1 ¡ ®); and ¹ K = ¹ F. Using these substitutions, we ¯nd
that (the steady-state version of) each of the ¯rst-order conditions (A.38) {
(A.45) is satis¯ed if the steady-state values satisfy
Á1 = (1 ¡ ®)Á2;
[fy(¹ Y ) ¡ ky(¹ Y ) ¡ ucc(¹ Y ¡ ¹ G)( ¹ G + ¹ ³)]Á2 = Uy(¹ Y ;1);
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Á4 = Á2;
Á5 = 0;
(1 ¡ ®¯)Á6 = ¡U¢(¹ Y ;1):
These equations can obviously be solved (uniquely) for the steady-state mul-
tipliers, given any value ¹ Y > 0:
Similarly, (the steady-state versions of) the constraints (A.32) { (A.37)
are satis¯ed if




wvy(¹ Y ); (A.46)
¹ ¿ ¹ Y = ¹ G + ¹ ³ + (1 ¡ ¯)¹ b; (A.47)
¹ K = ¹ F = (1 ¡ ®¯)
¡1k(¹ Y );
¹ W = uc(¹ Y ¡ ¹ G)¹ b:
Equations (A.46) { (A.47) provide two equations to solve for the steady-
state values ¹ Y and ¹ ¿: Under standard (Inada-type) boundary conditions on
preferences, equation (A.46) has a unique solution Y1(¿) > ¹ G for each possible
value of 0 · ¿ < 1;36 this value is a decreasing function of ¿; and approaches
¹ G as ¿ approaches 1. We note furthermore that at least in the case of all small
enough values of ¹ G, there exists a range of tax rates 0 < ¿1 < ¿ < ¿2 · 1
over which Y1(¿) > ¹ G=¿:37 Given our assumption that ¹ b > 0 and that ¹ G;
¹ ³ ¸ 0, (A.47) is satis¯ed only by positive values of ¹ ¿; and for each ¹ ¿ > 0; this
equation has a unique solution Y2(¿): We note furthermore that the locus
Y1(¿) is independent of the values of ¹ ³ and ¹ b, while Y2(¿) approaches ¹ G=¿ as
¹ ³ and ¹ b approach zero. Fixing the value of ¹ G (at a value small enough for the
interval (¿1;¿2) to exist), we then observe that for any small enough values
of ¹ b > 0 and ¹ ³ ¸ 0; there exist values 0 < ¿ < 1 at which Y2(¿) < Y1(¿): On
the other hand, for all small enough values of ¿ > 0; Y2(¿) > Y1(¿). Thus
36There is plainly no possibility of positive supply of output by producers in the case
that ¿t ¸ 1 in any period; hence the steady state must involve ¹ ¿ < 1:
37This is true for any tax rate at which (1 ¡ ¿)uc( ¹ G(¿¡1 ¡ 1)) exceeds (µ=(µ ¡
1))¹ ¹wvy( ¹ G=¿): Fixing any value 0 < ¿ < 1; our Inada conditions imply that this in-
equality holds for all small enough values of ¹ G. And if the inequality holds for some
0 < ¿ < 1; then by continuity it must hold for an open interval of values of ¿:
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This allows us to obtain a solution for 0 < ¹ ¿ < 1 and ¹ Y > 0; in the case of
any small enough values of ¹ G; ¹ ³ ¸ 0 and ¹ b > 0: The remaining equations can
then be solved (uniquely) for ¹ K = ¹ F and for ¹ W:
We have thus veri¯ed that a constant solution to the ¯rst-order conditions
exists. With a method to be explained below, we check that this solution
is indeed at least a local optimum. Note that as asserted in the text, this
deterministic steady state involves zero in°ation, and a steady-state tax rate
0 < ¹ ¿ < 1:
A.4 A second-order approximation to utility (equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.2))
We derive here equations (3.1) and (3.2) in the main text, taking a second-
order approximation to (equation (A.20)) following the treatment in Wood-
ford (2003, chapter 6). We start by approximating the expected discounted

































t¡t0 [u(Yt;»t) ¡ v(Yt;»t)¢t]: (A.49)
38In fact, there must exist at least two such solutions, since the Inada conditions also
imply that Y2(¿) > Y1(¿) for all ¿ close enough to 1. These multiple solutions correspond
to a \La®er curve" result, under which two distinct tax rates result in the same equilibrium
level of government revenues. We select the lower-tax, higher-output solution as the one
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expansion around the steady state de¯ned in the previous section as










t¹ u»»»t + O(jj»jj
3)





t ) + ¹ u»»t +
1
2
¹ Y ¹ ucc^ Y
2
t +





t¹ u»»»t + O(jj»jj
3)
= ¹ Y uc^ Yt +
1
2
[¹ Y ¹ uc + ¹ Y
2¹ ucc]^ Y
2
t ¡ ¹ Y
2¹ uccgt^ Yt + t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3)














where a bar denotes the steady-state value for each variable, a tilde denotes
the deviation of the variable from its steady-state value (e.g., ~ Yt ´ Yt ¡ ¹ Y ),
and a hat refers to the log deviation of the variable from its steady-state










in which ^ ³t ´ (³t¡³)=Y , ^ Gt ´ (Gt¡G)=Y , gt ´ ^ Gt+sC¹ ct, !qt ´ º¹ ht+Á(1+
º)at, ^ ¹w
t ´ ln¹w
t =¹ ¹w, ¹ ct ´ ln ¹ Ct= ¹ C, at ´ lnAt= ¹ A, ¹ ht ´ ln ¹ Ht= ¹ H. Moreover,
we use the de¯nitions ¾¡1 ´ ~ ¾¡1s
¡1
C with sC ´ ¹ C=Y and sC + sG = 1: We
have used the Taylor expansion







to get a relation for ~ Yt in terms of ^ Yt. Finally the term \t.i.p." denotes terms
that are independent of policy, and may accordingly be suppressed as far as
the welfare ranking of alternative policies is concerned.
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¹ vyy(Yt ¡ ¹ Y )
2 + (Yt ¡ ¹ Y )¹ vy»»t + O(jj»jj
3)













¹ vyy ¹ Y
2^ Y
2
t + ¹ Y ^ Yt¹ vy»»t + t:i:p:+O(jj»jj
3)
= ¹ vy ¹ Y [
¢t ¡ 1
1 + !
+ ^ Yt +
1
2
(1 + !)^ Y
2






We take a second-order expansion of (A.21), obtaining
^ ¢t = ®^ ¢t¡1 +
®
1 ¡ ®






This in turn allows us to approximate v(Yt;»t)¢t as




+ ^ Yt +
1
2
(1 + !)^ Y
2





where we have used the steady state relation ¹ vy = (1¡©)¹ uc to replace ¹ vy by
(1 ¡ ©)¹ uc, and where









measures the ine±ciency of steady-state output ¹ Y .
Combining (A.50) and (A.52), we ¯nally obtain equation (3.1) in the text,









t + b Ytu»»t ¡ u¢ ^ ¢t
+ t.i.p. + O(jj»jj
3); (A.53)
where
uyy ´ (! + ¾
¡1) ¡ (1 ¡ ©)(1 + !);
u»»t ´ [¾
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t ^ ¢t =
®
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)






t + t.i.p. + O(jj»jj
3):
(A.54)
By substituting (A.54) into (A.53), we obtain














This coincides with equation (3.2) in the text, where we have further de¯ned
· ´





µ(! + ¾¡1)(1 ¡ ©)
·
:
A.5 A second-order approximation to the AS equation
(equation (2.11))
We now compute a second-order approximation to the aggregate supply equa-
tion (A.16), or equation (2.11) in the main text. We start from (A.10) that








where e pt ´ p¤
t=Pt: As shown in Benigno and Woodford (2003), a second-order
expansion of this can be expressed in the form
(1 + !µ)
(1 ¡ ®¯)
^ ~ pt = zt + ®¯
(1 + !µ)
(1 ¡ ®¯)







(1 + !µ)^ ~ ptZt +
1
2








^ Pt;T ´ log(Pt=PT);
zt ´ !(^ Yt ¡ qt) + ~ ¾
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T¡t[XT + (1 ¡ 2µ ¡ !µ) ^ Pt;T]
)
;
and in this last expression
XT ´ (2 + !)^ YT ¡ !qT + ^ ¹
w
T + ^ ST ¡ ~ ¾
¡1( ^ CT ¡ ¹ cT);
where ^ St = ln(1 ¡ ¿t)=(1 ¡ ¹ ¿): Here \s.o.t.i.p." refers to second-order (or
higher) terms independent of policy; the ¯rst-order terms have been kept as
these will matter for the log-linear aggregate-supply relation that appears as
a constraint in our policy problem.
We next take a second-order expansion of the law of motion (A.15) for
the price index, obtaining











where we have used the fact that







































(1 ¡ 2µ ¡ !µ)Etf¼
2
t+1g + s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3): (A.57)
We note further that a second-order approximation to the identity Ct =
Yt ¡ Gt yields















C ^ Yt ^ Gt+s:o:t:i:p:+O(jj»jj
3); (A.58)
and that
^ St = ¡!¿^ ¿t ¡
!¿





where !¿ ´ ¹ ¿=(1¡¹ ¿): By substituting (A.58) and (A.59) into the de¯nition of
zt in (A.57), we ¯nally obtain a quadratic approximation to the AS relation.
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Ã (1 ¡ ¾¡1)Ã
(1 ¡ ¾¡1)Ã (2 + ! ¡ ¾¡1) + ¾¡1(1 ¡ s
¡1



















µ(1 + !)(! + ¾¡1)
·








xxt + z¼¼t + z
0
»»t + ®¯EtZt+1;
in which the coe±cients
Ã ´ !¿=(! + ¾
¡1);
and
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¼t = ·[^ Yt + Ã^ ¿t + c
0




»»t ´ (! + ¾
¡1)
¡1[¡¾
¡1gt ¡ !qt + ^ ¹
w
t ]:






















where the term c0
»»t is now included in terms independent of policy. (Such
terms matter when part of the log-linear constraints, as in the case of (A.61),
but not when part of the quadratic objective.)
A.6 A second-order approximation to the intertempo-
ral government solvency condition (equation (2.15))
We now derive a second-order approximation to the intertemporal govern-
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~ uc(Ct;»t)st = ¹ s~ uc + ~ ucc¹ s ~ Ct + ~ uc~ st + ¹ s~ uc»»t +
1
2
¹ s~ uccc ~ C
2
t + ~ ucc ~ Ct~ st + ¹ s ~ Ct~ ucc»»t
+~ st~ uc»»t + s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3);
= ¹ s~ uc + ~ ucc¹ s ¹ C ^ Ct + ~ uc~ st + ¹ s~ uc»»t +
1
2
¹ s(~ ucc ¹ C + ~ uccc ¹ C
2) ^ C
2
t + ¹ C~ ucc ^ Ct~ st +
¹ s ¹ C~ ucc»»t ^ Ct + ~ uc»»t~ st + s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3)
= ¹ s~ uc + ~ uc[¡e ¾
¡1¹ s ^ Ct + ~ st + ¹ s~ u
¡1






t ¡ e ¾
¡1~ st ^ Ct +
¹ s ¹ C~ u
¡1
c ~ ucc»»t ^ Ct + ~ u
¡1
c ~ uc»»t~ st] + s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3)
= ¹ s~ uc + ~ uc[¡~ ¾






t ¡ ~ ¾
¡1~ st( ^ Ct ¡ ¹ ct) ¡ ~ ¾
¡2¹ s¹ ct ^ Ct]
+s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3) (A.66)
where we have followed previous de¯nitions and use the isoelastic functional
forms assumed and note that we can write ~ u
¡1
c ~ uc»»t = ~ ¾¡1¹ ct and ¹ C~ u
¡1
c ~ ucc»»t =
¡~ ¾¡2¹ ct. Plugging (A.58) into (A.66) we obtain
~ uc(Ct; ~ »t)st = ¹ s~ uc[1 ¡ ¾
¡1^ Yt + ¾













¡1(^ Yt ¡ gt)~ st ¡ ¾
¡1(s
¡1
C ^ Gt + ¾
¡1gt)^ Yt] + s:o:t:i:p: +
+O(jj»jj
3) (A.67)
by using previous de¯nitions.
We recall now that the primary surplus is de¯ned as
st = ¿tYt ¡ Gt ¡ ³t
which can be expanded in a second-order expansion to get
¹ s
¡1~ st = (1 + !g)(^ Yt + ^ ¿t) ¡ s
¡1
d ( ^ Gt + ^ ³t) +
(1 + !g)
2




where we have de¯ned sd ´ ¹ s=Y ; !g = (G + ³)=s and ^ ³t = (³t ¡ ¹ ³)=Y .
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~ uc(Ct; ~ »t)st = ¹ s~ uc[1 ¡ ¾
¡1^ Yt + (1 + !g)(^ Yt + ^ ¿t) + ¾
¡1gt ¡ s
¡1






t + (1 + !g)(1 ¡ ¾





1 + !g + ¾
¡1(s
¡1









C ^ Gt + (¾
¡1 ¡ 1 ¡ !g)gt ¡ s
¡1
d ( ^ Gt + ^ ³t)]b Yt
+¾
¡1(1 + !g)gt^ ¿t] + s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3): (A.69)
Substituting (A.69) into (A.63), we obtain











tB»»t] + ¯Et ~ Wt+1
s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3) (A.70)





















(1 + !g) (1 ¡ ¾¡1)(1 + !g)
(1 ¡ ¾¡1)(1 + !g) (1 + !g) + (s
¡1










d ¾¡1 ¡ s
¡1
C ¾¡1 ¡¾¡1(¾¡1 ¡ 1 ¡ !g) 0 0
#
;
We further note from (A.70) that
~ Wt ´ (^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ e ¾
¡1 ^ Ct + ¹ ct) +
1
2
(^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ e ¾
¡1 ^ Ct + ¹ ct)
2 + O(jj»jj
3):
Substituting in (A.58), we obtain
~ Wt ´ ^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ ¾














(^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ ¾
¡1(^ Yt ¡ gt))
2 + s:o:t:i:p: + O(jj»jj
3)
which can be written as

















































0 0 0 0 0
0 ¡s
¡1
C ¾¡1 0 0 0
#
:
Note that in the ¯rst-order approximation we can simply write (A.70) as














Moreover integrating forward (A.70), we obtain that















where we have moved b0
»»t in t.i.p.
A.7 A quadratic policy objective (equations (3.3) and
(3.4))
We now derive a quadratic approximation to the policy objective function.
To this end, we combine equation (A.62) and (A.72) in a way to eliminate







x ´ [0 ©]:










¡ = (! + ¾
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+#1 ~ Wt0 + #2·
¡1Vt0 + t.i.p. + O(jj»jj
3)
where












































































qy ´ (1 ¡ ©)(! + ¾
¡1) + ©(! + ¾
¡1)
(1 + !g)(1 + !)
¡
+ ©¾






1 + !g + !¿
¡
;
moreover we have de¯ned
Q» =
"
0 0 0 0 0






















C ©(1 + !g + !¿)
¡
;
q»3 = ¡(1 ¡ ©)¾
¡1 ¡
¾¡1©(1 + !)(1 + !g)
¡
;
q»4 = ¡(1 ¡ ©)! ¡









©(1 + !g)µ(1 + !)(! + ¾¡1)
¡·
+
(1 ¡ ©)µ(! + ¾¡1)
·
:
We have further de¯ned ^ Y ¤









Tt0 ´ ¹ Y ¹ uc[#1 ~ Wt0 + #2·
¡1Vt0]
is a transitory component. Equation (A.73) corresponds to equation (3.3) in
the main text. In particular, given the commitments on the initial values of
the vector Xt0, Wt0 implies that ~ Wt0 is given when characterizing the optimal
policy from a timeless perspective. Moreover, Ft0 and Kt0 imply that Vt0 and
Zt0 are as well given. It follows that the value of the transitory component Tt0
is predetermined under the stage two of the Ramsey problem. Hence, over





















It follows that we may rank policies in terms of the implied value of the
discounted quadratic loss function (A.74) which corresponds to equation (3.4)
in the main text. Because this loss function is purely quadratic (i.e., lacking
linear terms), it is possible to evaluate it to second order using only a ¯rst-
order approximation to the equilibrium evolution of in°ation and output
under a given policy. Hence the log-linear approximate structural relations
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su±ces that we use log-linear approximations to the variables Vt0 and ~ Wt0 in
describing the initial commitments, which are given by
^ Vt0 = ¼t0;





= ^ bt0¡1 ¡ ¼t0 ¡ ¾
¡1(^ Yt0 ¡ gt0):
Then an optimal policy from a timeless perspective is a policy from date
t0 onward that minimizes the quadratic loss function (A.74) subject to the
constraints implied by the linear structural relations (A.61) and (A.71) hold-
ing in each period t ¸ t0; given the initial values ^ bt0¡1; ^ ¢t0¡1; and subject
also to the constraints that certain predetermined values for ^ Vt0 and ^ Wt0 (or
alternatively, for ¼t0 and for ^ Yt0) be achieved.39 We note that under the as-
sumption that ! + ¾¡1 > !¿ = ¹ ¿=(1 ¡ ¹ ¿), ¡ > 0, which implies that q¼ > 0.
Moreover, if
sC >
©¾¡1(1 + !g + !¿)
(1 ¡ ©)(! + ¾¡1)¡ + ©(! + ¾¡1)(1 + !g)(1 + !) + ©¾¡1(1 + !g)(1 + !¿)
;
then qy > 0 and the objective function is convex. Since the expression on
the right-hand side of this inequality is necessarily less than one (given that
¡ > 0), the inequality is satis¯ed for all values of sG less than a positive
upper bound.
A.8 The log-linear aggregate-supply relation and the
cost-push disturbance term
The AS equation (A.61) can be written as
¼t = ·[yt + Ã^ ¿t + ut] + ¯Et¼t+1; (A.75)
where ut is composite \cost-push" shock de¯ned as ut ´ c0
»»t + ^ Y ¤
t . We can
write (A.75) as
¼t = ·[yt + Ã(^ ¿t ¡ ^ ¿
¤
t )] + ¯Et¼t+1; (A.76)
39The constraint associated with a predetermined value for Zt0 can be neglected, in a
¯rst-order characterization of optimal policy, because the variable Zt does not appear in
the ¯rst-order approximation to the aggregate-supply relation.
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ut = u
0












































in a way that we can write (A.61)
¼t = ·[(^ Yt ¡ ^ Y
¤
t ) + Ã(^ ¿t ¡ ^ ¿
¤
t )] + ¯Et¼t+1; (A.77)
which is equation (3.7) in the text.
A.9 The log-linear intertemporal solvency condition
and the \¯scal stress" disturbance term
The °ow budget constraint (A.71) can be solved forward to yield the in-
tertemporal solvency condition
^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ ¾




T¡t[byyT + b¿(^ ¿T ¡ ^ ¿
¤
T)] (A.78)
where ft; the ¯scal stress disturbance term, is de¯ned as
ft ´ ¾
¡1(gt ¡ ^ Y
¤












¡1(gt ¡ ^ Y
¤
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April 2004This can be rewritten in a more compact way as
ft ´ h
0






























































































¿ (1 + !g);
h»5 ´ ¾
¡1©










¿ (1 + !g):
A.10 De¯nition of the coe±cients in sections 3, 4 and
5




¡1(1 ¡ ¯)b¿ + q
¡1
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¡1 ¡ 1)(m' + n');
mb ´ ¡n'[(1 ¡ ¯)b¿Ã
¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)by ¡ ¾
¡1];
~ mb ´ ¾
¡1n' + !' ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)[b¿Ã






















The coe±cients ¹1 and ¹2 of section 5 are de¯ned as
¹1 ´
·Ã
(1 ¡ ¯)b¿ + ·Ã
¹2 ´
·(1 ¡ ¯)(b¿ ¡ Ãby)
(1 ¡ ¯)b¿ + ·Ã
:
A.11 Proof of determinacy of equilibrium under the
optimal targeting rules
We now show that there is a determinate equilibrium if policy is conducted
so as to ensure that the two target criteria




' (m' + n')¼t ¡ !
¡1
' n'¢¼t = 0 (A.80)
are satis¯ed in each period t ¸ t0: Note that (A.80) can be written as
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to eliminate Et¼t+1;Etyt+1 and ¿t ¡ ^ ¿¤
t from
^ bt¡1 ¡ ¼t ¡ ¾
¡1yt + ft = (1 ¡ ¯)[byyt + b¿(^ ¿t ¡ ^ ¿
¤
t )]
+ ¯Et[^ bt ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ ¾
¡1^ yt+1 + ft+1]:
Then further use (A.80) to eliminate yt from the resulting expression. One
obtains an equation of the form
^ bt = ¯
¡1^ bt¡1 + m41¼t + m42¼t¡1 + m43yt¡1 + "t;
where "t is an exogenous disturbance. The system consisting of this equation
plus (A.80) and (A.79) can then be written as























0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
m31 m32 1 0






















Because M is lower triangular, its eigenvalues are the four diagonal ele-
ments: 0, 0, 1, and ¯¡1: Hence there is exactly one eigenvalue outside the
unit circle, and equilibrium is determinate (but possesses a unit root). Be-
cause of the triangular form of the matrix, one can also easily solve explicitly
for the elements of the left eigenvector
v
0 = [v1 v2 v3 1]
associated with the eigenvalue ¯¡1, where
v1 = (1 + !g)[Ã
¡1 ¡ 1]¯°4 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯¾
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¡1 ¡ 1]°4;
v3 = (1 + !g)[Ã
¡1 ¡ 1]:
Pre-multiplying the vector equation by v0, one obtains a scalar equation with







In the case that v1 6= 0, this can be solved for ¼t as a linear function of














The solution for ¼t can then be substituted into the above equations to obtain
the equilibrium dynamics of yt and ^ bt as well, and hence of ¿t also.
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